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Fiscal responsibility laws are institutions with which 
multiple governments in the same economy—national 
and subnational—can commit to help avoid irresponsible 
fiscal behavior that could have short-term advantages to 
one of them but that would be collectively damaging. 
Coordination failures with subnational governments 
in the 1990s contributed to macroeconomic instability 
and led several countries to adopt fiscal responsibility 
laws as part of the remedy. The paper analyzes the 
characteristics and effects of fiscal responsibility laws in 
seven countries—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, India, and Peru. Fiscal responsibility laws 
are designed to address the short time horizons of 
policymakers, free riders among government units, and 
principal agent problems between the national and 
subnational governments. The paper describes how 
the laws differ in the specificity of quantitative targets, 
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the strength of sanctions, the methods for increasing 
transparency, and the level of government passing the law. 
   Evidence shows that fiscal responsibility laws can help 
coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence, 
but they are not a substitute for commitment and should 
not be viewed as ends in themselves. They can make a 
positive contribution by adding to the collection of other 
measures to shore up a coalition of states with the central 
government in support of fiscal prudence. Policymakers 
contemplating fiscal responsibility laws may benefit 
from the systematic review of international practice. 
One common trait of successful fiscal responsibility laws 
for subnational governments is the commitment of the 
central government to its own fiscal prudence, which is 
usually reinforced by the application of the law at the 
national as well as the subnational level. 
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I.  Introduction 
As subnational governments (SNGs) in developing and developed countries have 
gained  more  fiscal  autonomy—spending  responsibilities,  tax  bases,  revenue  transfers 
from the center, and the capacity to incur debt—their fiscal behavior has become vital to 
the national interest.   When SNGs follow unsustainable fiscal policy, it can jeopardize 
the  services  they  manage  (but  for  which  the  central  government  may  have  ultimate 
political  responsibility),  the safety of the financial  system,  the country’s international 
creditworthiness, and overall macroeconomic stability.  Too often the central government 
then gets dragged in to provide bailouts, which can disrupt its own fiscal sustainability 
and reward the populist fiscal tactics of the recipient SNGs.  The global financial crisis of 
2008-2010 has tested the effectiveness of FRLs in maintaining fiscal discipline and has 
shown some downsides of rigidity in the face of macroeconomic shocks.  
Since the 1990s many governments have intensified the search for mechanisms to 
escape from fiscal populism that had been used as a strategy for winning elections and 
retaining public office.  National governments have tried various ways to avert these 
problems.  One way has been to pass a fiscal responsibility law (FRL) that prescribes 
proper  fiscal  behavior  for  SNGs,  provides  guidelines  for  parameters  of  SNG  fiscal 
legislation, or sets incentives – rewards for success or sanctions for failure in following 
the rules.  Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru have done so.  Some SNGs, as in 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, and  India have imposed legal  constraints  on their own 
fiscal behavior, to reduce the temptation of state administrations to leave fiscal messes 
and  to  improve  their  creditworthiness  in  the  markets.
2 Although having not formally 
adopted  subnational  fiscal responsibility legislation, other countries such as Mexico, 
Poland, and Turkey have established fiscal rules or debt limitations for SNGs.  
In this paper, we focus on FRLs that are called fiscal responsib ility laws or that 
perform  the same  function.  They  have  frameworks  for  making  the  budget  process 
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transparent  and  may  include  quantitative  fiscal  targets  and  enforcement  mechanisms.  
They aim to restrain SNG deficits by preventing them in advance and/or by imposing 
extra  penalties  that  go  into  effect  more  quickly  and  in  addition  to  the  inherent 
consequences  of  fiscal  imprudence.    These  include  both  institutions  imposed  by  the 
national government on the SNGs and institutions imposed by the SNGs on themselves.  
FRLs often have the additional effect of restraining the federal or central government 
from running unsustainable deficits and of mitigating the consequences of subnational 
fiscal excesses.  The paper does not focus on other public finance laws, such as budget 
laws and debt laws, which contain elements of FRLs, although it does consider such laws 
when discussing the broader context of fiscal prudence.  
This paper analyzes the circumstances and character of FRLs that may make a 
positive contribution to better SNG fiscal behavior.
3  As FRLs do not operate in isolation, 
the paper also considers the broader context of other laws and rules aimed at obtaining 
prudent fiscal behavior by SNGs.  The paper includes Brazil, Colombia and Peru, where 
a unifying FRL applies to all levels of the government including the SNGs.  In some 
other countries such as Argentina, Australia, and India, the FRL framework includes a 
national FRL, and SNGs may choose their own FRL framework.  Provinces in Canada 
went  ahead  with  their  ow n  FRLs  within  the  overall  national  move  toward  fiscal 
consolidation. Although the paper mainly concerns FRLs that apply to SNGs, the paper 
will include the analysis of the national FRLs to the extent that they affect the parameters 
and incentives for SNGs.
4     
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section explains the historical 
origins of FRLs in the context of political and fiscal decentralization.  Section III 
examines the purposes, incentives, and authority behind FRLs  –  which  level  of  the 
government passes FRL and to which level of government the FRL applies. Section IV 
summarizes the content of FRLs, covering procedural and transparency rules, and fiscal 
targets  as  well  as  sanctions  and  escape  clause  associated  with  the  rules.    Section  V 
analyzes  FRLs  in  broader  institutional  context  for  fiscal  prudence  and  channels  for 
strengthening subnational fiscal discipline. Section VI explores preliminary assessments 
of the effects of FRLs.  Section VII concludes and points to areas for further research.  
II.  Historical Origins of FRLs 
  Fiscal  rules  and  legislation  for  SNGs  are  less  important  when  a  country  has 
centralized political and fiscal institutions, as these centralized institutions can set rules 
and use political power to enforce discipline of SNGs. Decentralization, often associated 
with  rise  of  regional  powers,  has  reduced  the  central  administrative  control  over 
subnational fiscal behavior.  
  Since the 1980s, a number of countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
India, Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia, have decentralized varying degrees of fiscal authority 
                                                 
3 This paper will not address the issue of whether subnational governments should borrow or not. This issue 
relates to broader questions of fiscal decentralization, political autonomy of subnational governments, and 
revenue  base  that  can  be  used  for  collateralizing  the  debt. The  paper  covers  a  set  of  countries  where 
subnational governments have the authority to borrow. 




and resources to their SNGs.  Often, in the absence of adequate ex ante fiscal rules, this 
contributed  to  subnational  fiscal  stress  or  debt  crises;  some  were  triggered  by 
deteriorating  macroeconomic  environment.    In  some  places  that  have  been  fiscally 
decentralized for a long time, like Australia and Canada, the SNGs also had experienced 
fiscal challenges. All of these countries have subsequently strengthened their frameworks 
for SNG fiscal sustainability, and several of them passed fiscal responsibility laws as part 
of that framework.   
  In each case, the features of the law, how it was passed, and its implementation 
reflected the particular political structure of the country and the nature of its fiscal crisis.  
This  section  summarizes  those  particularities,  as  prologue  to  the  discussion  of  their 
FRLs—first the federal countries and then the unitary.
   The federal countries in our 
sample—Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada,  and  India—tend  to  be  more  fiscally 
decentralized;  the  key  distinction,  however,  is  that  the  constitutions  of  the  federal 
countries give the states or provinces the right to make their own laws in many areas and 
restrict the range of areas for which the national government can legislate.  Shifts in the 
allocation  of  taxing  powers,  for  instance,  have  to  be  negotiated  with  the  states;  the 
national government cannot decide unilaterally.
5  By contrast, in the unitary countries—
here,  Colombia  and  Peru—the  constitution  gives  the  national  government  power  to 
legislate in all areas and to decide unilaterally what powers and fiscal resources it will 
delegate to the SNGs.   
Federalism in Brazil in the 1980s revived with the return to democracy from 
military  rule.    From  1982  to  1989  there  was  a  sequence  of  electing  governors,  then 
electing mayors, electing a new congress with constitution-making authority, completing 
the new constitution, and finally holding the first direct election of the president. Thanks 
to the strong representation of SNGs in the 1986 congress, the 1988 constitution gave 
states significant authority and resources, including a much broader revenue base for the 
state-level VAT, but did not specify their spending responsibilities or set rules for fiscal 
prudence.   
From the beginning of Brazil’s political opening through mid-1990s, there were 
two major subnational debt crises. Each initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis 
actually made the next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the perception that the 
federal government would provide debt relief, they provided such relief in the form of 
rescheduling (allowing the stock of debt to keep growing), set ceilings on debt service 
and thus on the effective political cost, bought  out (without penalty) the foreign and 
private creditors to the SNGs and left the federal government holding the debt.  Thus the 
state politicians suffered minimal consequences for their imprudence and their creditors 
suffered almost none, and so until 1997 the ex ante constraints written in the rescheduling 
agreements were usually quickly evaded (Dillinger 1997; Rodden 2003).  
 Then in the late 1990s, this vicious cycle of failure in discipline and cooperation 
came  to  a  halt,  as  the  deeper  political  and  economic  incentives  had  changed  after  a 
national  macroeconomic  adjustment  program  ended  hyperinflation  and  stabilized  the 
                                                 
5 The  constitution  of  a  country  can  also  set  forth  the  authority  of  taxation.    For  example,  the  India 




economy. In 1997-98 the federal government made debt restructuring agreements with 25 
states, which was finally effective in making them cease unsustainable borrowing.  Three 
of the four largest debtor states supported the reforms and formed the core of a critical 
mass of states ready to cooperate in fiscal restraint, making it worthwhile for additional 
states  join  at  the  margin  of  cooperation.  Also,  the  large  scale  of  the  states’  non-
performing  debt  to  the  federal  government  strengthened  the  resolve  of  the  federal 
Congress to enact the FRL.  The federal government negotiated agreements with 25 states 
in 1997 and 1998.
6  These agreements were sanctioned by Law 9496 of September 1997 
to  reschedule  the  states’  debt  conditioned  on  states  undertaking  fiscal  reforms  and 
compliance with fiscal targets.  The FRL in 2000 codified fiscal adjustment programs 
sanctioned by various resolutions (Alfonso 2002; Dillinger 2002).  At the time, many 
observers doubted whether the federal government would successfully enforce the debt 
restructuring agreement and sustain the stabilization, and this is why the extraordinary 
measure of the FRL may have been necessary, to reinforce the expectations of stability.   
Argentine provinces in the 1980s had no hard budget constraint, borrowed a lot, 
and effectively could monetize this debt, contributing to hyperinflation.  The subsequent 
stabilization  in  1991  centered  on  the  Convertibility  Plan,  which  fixed  the  Argentine 
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. Through the 1990s the national government mainly 
followed  a  market-based  strategy  for  coordinating  fiscal  discipline  between  levels  of 
government:  the central government would enforce hard budget constraints ex post and 
force the provinces to pay their debts (Dillinger and Webb 1999).  By the end of the 
1990s, the absence of the ex ante fiscal controls had allowed a number of Argentine 
provinces  to  over-borrow,  party  fragmentation  had  narrowed  the  scope  for  fiscal 
compromises, and the national government had overcommitted itself  by setting floors on 
transfers, even if national revenues fell (Gonzalez, Rosenblatt and Webb 2004).  
At the national level, faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt 
payments, in 1999 the Congress approved a Fiscal Solvency Law—its first try at an FRL.  
It aimed to and did inspire a third of the provinces to pass their own FRLs. In 2001, 
however,  the  FRLs  stopped  working  because  of  the  extreme  mismatch  between  the 
national  government’s  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  because  the  provincial  FRLs 
lacked enforcement power and most of the economically important provinces had not 
passed them. Only 5 out of 11 provinces that imposed a hard budget constraint actually 
fulfilled their commitment (Braun and Tomassi 2004).  In 2004, Argentina tried anew 
with a national FRL that applied to the provinces as well as the national government and 
capital federal district.  It passed Congress hastily (Braun and Gadano 2006; Laudonia 
2009), and it did not come out of a consensus building process with the provinces nor 
reflect a solid technical consideration of how the provinces might adjust their finances to 
meet the legal requirements. Although many provinces complied with some of the law’s 
procedural requirements, almost none were meeting the quantitative targets even before 
the onset of the global crisis in 2009.  After that the quantitative targets were put on hold, 
which further undermined the credibility of the FRL process in Argentina. 
                                                 
6 Only two states (Tocantins and Amapá) did not have any bonded debt, and hence did not participate in the 




The Indian Constitution forbids states from borrowing abroad and requires them 
to obtain central permission for domestic borrowing.  The central  government places 
limits on states’ borrowing through the annual discussions with states on financing state 
development plans.  While limiting explosive growth of state debt, the system has not 
prevented deterioration of fiscal trends as indicated by high levels of debt over GSDP in 
many states in the late 1990s.  Factors contributing to the deteriorating fiscal accounts 
across  Indian  states  in  the  1990s  include:  rapid  increase  in  expenditures  on  salaries, 
retirement  benefits,  and  pensions  and  subsidies,  increased  borrowing  to  support  the 
growing  revenue  deficit,  and  growth  in  contingent  liabilities  associated  with  fiscal 
support to the public sector units, cooperatives, and the statutory boards. 
Since the early 2000s, the fiscal reform has focused on moving towards a more 
flexible,  market-linked  borrowing  regime  within  sustainable  overall  borrowing  caps 
imposed by the central government and self-imposed state-level deficit caps.   The federal 
government enacted Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act in 2003 which 
applies to the national government only, but some states had also adopted their own FRLs 
before the enactment of the federal FRL (e.g., Karnataka and Punjab in 2002) and many 
states have since 2003 adopted FRLs in line with the national law.  FRL has become 
mandatory after the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005) and the federal government has 
offered a sizeable incentive to states for passing FRL.  
  The idea of legislating for fiscal responsibility gained considerable attention in the 
1990s in Australia. At the federal level, the Business Council of Australia called for 
legislation requiring a surplus budget on average over the business cycle. It reiterated this 
theme during the 1996 federal election campaign. The adoption of the Charter of Budget 
Honesty  Act  in  1998  at  the  federal  level  followed  years  of  improvement  in  fiscal 
outcomes. In fact, in the mid-1980s, Australia adopted its first set of explicit fiscal rules 
limiting the growth of expenditure, taxation and budget deficit. Although the recession in 
the 1990s saw the net debt of the country increased, never went beyond 20 percent of 
GDP.  The  combined  state  and  Commonwealth  general  government  net  debt  had  not 
exceeded 30 percent of GDP in the 1990s (Simes, 2003).  
Some  states  had  adopted  fiscal  responsibility  legislation  prior  to  the  federal 
government’s adoption.  New South Wales passed legislation in 1995 to commit itself 
and future governments to medium- and long-term fiscal responsible targets including the 
elimination of the net debt.  Victoria passed the Financial Management Act in 1994, 
which  was  amended  in  2000  through  the  Financial  Management  (Financial 
Responsibility) Act, which outlines principles of sound financial management, reporting 
standards and pre-election budget update. Minister must produce a pre-election budget 
update 10 days after the issue of a writ for an election. The Act broadly states what the 
update must contain and the principles upon which it must be based.   
In Canada,  in  the 1990s  both  the federal  and  provincial  governments  needed 




years of lax fiscal policy.
7  The drive for restoring fiscal health was viewed as means to 
help accelerate economic growth. The deteriorating sovereign ratings
8 increased the cost 
of borrowing, and private saving was not sufficient to finance both private investments 
and chronic fiscal deficits (Traclet 2004).  The federal government undertook legislative 
reforms during the 1999s: enacting the Federal Spending Control Act (1991) setting 
limits on spending, and adopting a new framework to meet the medium -term fiscal 
balance and decrease debt rat io with rolling short-term deficit targets. Such measures 
succeeded in significantly reducing the national debt (IMF, 2002).  
In this context, many provinces in the 1990s also adopted legislation to promote 
balanced-budgets and debt reduction (Millar 1997)
9, which may have helped increase the 
provincial  finance  ministers’  bargaining  power  to  promote  unpopular  fiscal  measures 
(Kennedy and Robbins, 2003). These legislation set specific fiscal targets such as annual 
balanced budget and target year for debt elimination (Alberta), prohibited budget deficits 
in any year (Manitoba), set deadlines for achieving a balanced operating account (New 
Brunswick), and required net expenditures to decline by a certain percentage over a four-
year period (Nova Scotia).  Three more provinces enacted similar acts in 2000-2004.
10  
For example, New Brunswick adopted Fiscal Responsibility and Balanced Budget Act in 
2006 to cover the entire provincial budget, following the Balanced Budget Act in 1995. 
The province also enacted the Fis cal Stabilization Act in 2001 to stabilize the fiscal 
position from year to year and improve long-term fiscal planning and stability.   
Colombia  has  traditionally  been  centralist,  to  offset  the  natural  geographic 
fragmentation and to try to contain the centrifugal forces of strong special interest groups.  
Overlying the natural geographic fragmentation, strong non-regional interests dominate 
the political dialogue—some operate within the legitimate political system, like teachers 
and producers of coffee, cattle and sugar, while others are outside and challenging it, 
namely two guerilla movements, the paramilitaries, and drug producers.  Decentralization 
started in Colombia with the 1968 deconcentration of national revenues to subnational 
administrative  units,  with  revenue  sharing  set  by  formula  and  mostly  earmarked  for 
specific  sectors  (Bird  1984).    The  1991  constitution  (which  also  made  the  office  of 
governor an elected post) and Law 60 of 1993 expanded the amount of revenues assigned 
to  departments  by  broadening  the  base  of  the  existing  revenue-sharing  system  (the 
situado fiscal).  The Constitution and Law 60 committed the national government each 
year to expand revenue sharing with SNGs until it would reach nearly half of all current 
revenues by 2002.   
In  the  late  1980s  and  1990s  the  trend  toward  political  decentralization  was 
accompanied by more freedom for subnational domestic borrowing, and hence a rise in 
their debt.  To increase the central government’s control over subnational debt, the so-
                                                 
7 The  fiscal  correction  was  concurrent  with  monetary  policy  of  inflation  targeting.  The  attainment  of 
announced targets has improved market and public confidence in the central bank’s commitment to low and 
stable inflation (Traclet, 2004). 
8 Rating agencies downgraded the sovereign debt: in foreign currency in 1994 and in local currency in 1995 
by Moody’s and in foreign currency in 1993.   
9 Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Northwest Territories, the 
Yukon from 1993-1996.  




called Traffic Light Law of 1997 introduced a rating system for territorial governments, 
based on the ratios of interest to operational savings and of debt to current revenues. 
Highly  indebted  local  governments  (red  light)  were  prohibited  from  borrowing,  and 
intermediate cases (yellow light) were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Finance.  The law often did not have the desired effect, however, as some governments 
with  a red-light  rating  obtained new financing without permission of the Ministry of 
Finance, and departments often changed from yellow to red, rather than moving from 
yellow to green, as expected.  In a new attempt to implement fiscal rules to stabilize 
subnational finances, Colombia passed Law 617 in 2000, which functioned in many ways 
as a Subnational FRL; despite the fiscal crisis at the national level in 2001-02, Law 617 
had some success at the subnational level and laid the foundations for subsequent steps.  
In June 2003 the government passed the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which applied to the 
national as well as the subnational governments.   
Peru is a unitary state, with even more of a centrist tradition than Colombia.  
Decentralization  came  relatively  late  to  Peru,  as  part  of  a  democratic  reaction  after 
Fujimori’s exit in 2001.  The 2002 decentralization law foresaw having half or more of 
public  sector  spending  managed  and  to  some  extent  allocated  by  subnational 
governments—districts,  and municipalities—compared to the previous situation where 
SNGs managed less than 10 percent of public spending.  In contrast to the experiences of 
the other Latin American countries discussed here, the behavior of subnational public 
finances in Peru never deteriorated to the point where it adversely affected the country’s 
financial sector or macroeconomic stability. As they contemplated fiscal decentralization 
and saw the macroeconomic problems that decentralized countries had had in the 1990s, 
the authorities passed the FRL and other measures to assure that fiscal decentralization 
did not lead to fiscal imbalances.  As discussed below, the restraint measures in Peru 
succeeded perhaps too well, preventing effective fiscal devolution. 
III.  FRLs – Purpose, Incentives, and Authority 
Before delving into the content of FRLs (section IV), we need to understand why 
governments might pass such laws, how they fit in the political context, how they address 
the timing of borrowing-lending decisions, which level of government passes them, and 
to which governments the FRL applies. 
A.  Aligning fiscal incentives  
In a normative theory of good government, voters want to avoid the effects of a 
fiscal crisis—inflationary finance, sudden increase of taxes, disruption of service, and 
increased borrowing costs—so their government would equally want to avoid the crises.  
In practice, governments may fail to follow sustainable fiscal policies for a variety of 
reasons discussed in this section (see Alesina 1994 for a survey and Saeigh and Tommasi 
2000  for  applications  to  federations).    Multiple  levels  of  government  multiply  the 
possible  reasons  for  failure  of  fiscal  responsibility.  To  deal  with  these  problems, 
governments have adopted various institutions to try to restrain themselves, including 




committees.  Since the late 1990s, governments have added FRLs to the potential and 
actual toolkit.   
Governments appear to be interested in FRLs to deal with four problems:  i) short 
time horizons of policymakers; ii) free riders among SGNs; iii) principal agent and moral 
hazards  problems  between  the  national  and  SN  governments;  and  iv)  demonstrating 
commitments to be creditworthy.    The first and fourth problems apply to governments at 
any level, whereas the second and third are relevant mainly in countries with multilevel 
government. 
Short time-horizons of policymakers. A government may wish to institutionalize 
its  commitment  to  control  its  impulses  to  run  excessive  deficits,  in  order  to  resist 
temptation in more pressing times that may come in the future.  Policymakers often have 
shorter  time-horizons  than  citizens,  because  they  have  shorter  terms  of  office  than 
citizens’ life spans and policymakers face the risk of being voted out of office if results 
are painful in the short-term.   So legislators can gain favor by passing a law (e.g., FRL) 
that provides extra motivation for longer term fiscal sustainability.   
Free riders.  A group of governments in the same country may wish to make and 
enforce a mutual agreement that each of them would avoid running excessive deficits.  
To see the free-rider problem in this context, suppose that multiple governments share the 
same  currency,  central  bank,  domestic  credit  market,  and  (at  least  to  some  extent) 
international credit reputation.  Then they will share a common interest in sustainable 
fiscal  balances  for  the  country  in  the  aggregate,  to  maintain  stable  prices,  a  healthy 
financial  system,  and  good  access  to  international  credit.    Individual  governments’ 
interests  would  diverge  from  the  common  interest,  however,  in  that  factors  such  as 
electoral  pressures  would  motivate  them  to  follow  fiscal  behavior  that  is  risky  or 
unsustainable.    An  individual  government  would  bear  only  part  of  the  cost  of  its 
misbehavior, but would still receive all of whatever perceived benefit accrued.  They 
could benefit from this, however, only if (most of) the other governments continued to 
follow good fiscal behavior.  So, there might be prisoners’ dilemma—a situation where 
the equilibrium of isolated individual choices leads to suboptimal outcomes for all.
11  All 
the governments would, therefore, benefit from having a system of rules —an FRL—to 
discourage such defection and free-riding.  
In a country with multiple governments, the national government already exists 
for the purpose (among others) of protecting the common interests, has much greater 
fiscal weight than the others, and typically has special powers, like running the central 
bank and regulating the financial sector.  The national government also provides transfers 
to  the  SNGs,  which  often  are  the  main  source  of  subnational  revenue  and  give  the 
                                                 
11 Inman  (2003)  develops  the  prisoners’  dilemma  model  formally  for  this  situation  and  shows  how 
restrictive are the conditions under which the market successfully establishes SN fiscal discipline if the 
central government takes a hands-off no-bailout approach.  The conditions include competitive suppliers of 
local public services, a  stable central  government, clear  and enforceable accounting  standards, a  well-
managed  aggregate  economy,  and  an  informed  and  sophisticated  local  government  bond  market.    No 
developing country has these complete conditions, and the international financial crisis of 2008-09 will test 





national government additional leverage over them.  But this may not be enough.  Rules 
of revenue sharing and other rules of the system (like the constitution) may restrain the 
national  government’s  power  over  the  SNGs.    Political  considerations  may  bias  the 
decisions of the national government away from the optimal; these could be the national 
political cycle or subnational ones (Braun and Tomassi 2004).  For instance when a state 
government of the same political party as the national government faces a close election, 
the national government might be inclined to condone the state’s fiscal misbehavior by 
offering a debt bailout or rescheduling guarantee.  Also, under some configurations of 
political institutions, the national executive might need to purchase blocks of legislative 
votes  through  provincial  fiscal  favors,  in  ways  that  also  break  the  inter-temporal 
Wicksellian connection, by which voters demand fiscal discipline to protect their interest 
as taxpayers. Thus, the agreement to protect the common interest would not only need to 
restrain the fiscal behavior of the individual SNGs but also restrain the behavior of the 
federal government. 
Principal-agent and moral hazard problems. When citizens or a higher level of 
government (the principal) entrusts a subnational government (agent) with resources and 
the responsibility to carry out a task, then there is the principal-agent problem in assuring 
that the agent government will maintain the requisite fiscal stability to carry out the task, 
without default or bailout. Sub-national borrowers as agents have an incentive not to 
repay their lenders as principals because they perceive that they will be bailed-out by the 
central  government  in  case  of  default,  resulting  in  moral  hazard.  This  hazard  may 
increase when the central government is also the creditor, since rollover of the debt is 
often  the  easy  way  out  when  an  SNG  does  not  pay  what  it  owes  to  the  central 
government. The incidence of these agency problems varies considerably depending on 
the structure of the subnational debt market in each country.  For instance, the credibility 
and prudence of a no-bailout commitment by the national government in the event of 
subnational default depends partly on whether the creditors to the defaulting SNG are 
foreign or domestic.   
Demonstrating commitment to be creditworthy.  Borrowers, including SNGs, have 
an incentive not to reveal negative characteristics about themselves to lenders, which 
results in adverse selection— lenders will therefore charge a risk premium above what is 
directly justified by the revealed information, even for a borrower who is not risky.  So 
the asymmetrical information can lead to mispricing of risks. To improve its terms of 
borrowing,  a  government  needs  to  show  creditors  that  it  is  not  like  those  other 
government units of lesser credit or that it has given up the fiscally irresponsible ways of 
its past.   It can demonstrate this commitment by constraining itself with a FRL, its own 
or  from  the  national  level.    Once  one  government  demonstrates  its  commitment  by 
passing an FRL, the pressure increases on other governments in the country to follow 
suit,  in  order  not  to  stand  out  as  the  government  that  is  not  committed  to  fiscal 
responsibility.  If the entire country has an FRL framework, then it will be the adherence 
to the fiscal targets that will become more important.  
 
Fiscal responsibility laws have some downsides as well. Most importantly they 
tend to make aggregate fiscal policy more pro-cyclical.  Although most FRLs have some 




has been difficult to set these up in a way that are adequately countercyclical, while still 
demanding rigorous fiscal responsibility (Melamud 2010).   
B.  Incentives in the political system for fiscal prudence  
The political characteristics of the countries affect both the need for subnational 
fiscal-control institutions and their effectiveness.  Indeed, to some extent the political 
factors that increase the need for an FRL also make it more difficult to pass one and to 
enforce it successfully.  Several dimensions of political system are relevant:  i) a majority 
party  of  the  executive  in  legislature  versus  coalition  (parliamentary)  or  divided 
government  (presidential);  ii)  strong  party  identities  and  unity,  including  closed-list 
nominations for legislature, versus weak parties and open lists; iii) autonomy of SNGs 
constitutionally versus national government power to intervene and otherwise control;  
and iv) a strong role for the national legislature and strong influence of governors over 
legislators, versus strong national executive authority (Dillinger and Webb 1999).  To the 
extent that the constitution and party system lead to more centralized power, the country 
will  have  less  need  for  special  institutions  to  coordinate  fiscal  discipline  across 
governments over time and between states.  In some countries in our sample, however, 
the fiscal decentralization was part of a more general decentralization of power, which 
was linked with the restoration or establishment of democratic rule (Garman et al 2001). 
The party with centralist tendencies and strong public sector dominance may be more 
interested in pushing a certain development path through state control, central planning 
and  a  strong  public  sector  than  fiscal  management.  Subsequent  decentralization  and 
market decontrol have led to increasing need for central coordination of policies. 
  The national and SNGs are not always autonomous agents, as the previous section 
presumed. For instance they can be manifestations of the same political party.  Such 
arrangements can reduce the free-rider and principal-agent problems described above, 
because the party aligns the incentives of the national and subnational politicians.  The 
Argentine Justicialista (Peronist) Party in the mid 1990s and the Indian Congress Party in 
its  years  of  dominance  performed  similar  functions  of  harmonizing  the  incentives  of 
policymakers at  national and subnational  levels.  When the single-party  dominance in 
these countries ended or diminished substantially, with the increase of democracy, the 
absence  of  the  extra-constitutional  (but  legal)  channels  for  inter-governmental 
coordination created the need for FRLs or other formal mechanisms for coordination.   
  Even without a strong party system, a powerful president can enforce subnational 
fiscal discipline.
12  President Cardoso in Brazil became a strong president in the late 
1990s even in a context of weak party loyalties and used his office (and reputation as an 
inflation fighter, from when he was Minister of Finance) to press successfully  for fiscal 
discipline at the national and subnational levels.  The institutionalization of this discipline 
included the FRL but had already started with some previous measures.  President Uribe 
in Colombia also used his political popularity, without a str ong party base, to pass the 
FRL in 2003.  This was in the context since the late 1990s of much weaker loyalties to 
                                                 
12 Although a strong president usually creates a party of his followers, if the main unifying factor is the 




the two traditionally strong parties, which had fought over many things but had agreed on 
maintaining macroeconomic stability. 
  These examples show the importance of the particular political situation in each 
country—with effects both on whether the country needs an FRL and whether it can 
gather  the  consensus  to  pass  one.    An  FRL  seems  most  likely  when  there  is  an 
intermediate degree of political cohesion—with a high degree of cohesion an FRL may 
not be needed, and with a low degree one cannot pass or enforce the FRL. 
C.  Authority: Which government passes the FRL? To which government 
does it apply? 
The  FRLs  differ  in  terms  of  which  government  passes  it  and  to  which 
government(s) it applies but the content of the two types is similar.  Some FRLs are 
national  laws  that  apply  to  all  levels  of  government,  or  at  least  to  the  national  and 
intermediate (state, provincial) levels, as in Argentina (2004), Brazil (2000), Colombia 
(2003), and Peru (2003).  From the SNG point of view, these are top-down systems.
13  In 
other cases, such as Argentina (1999), Australia, and India, the federal government passes 
an FRL only for itself, and this sets the framework, incentive, or example for the SNGs to 
pass their own FRLs voluntarily.  In some cases, a SNG would enact it s own FRL (e.g., 
the Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and some Australian states) before the 
enactment of the federal FRL. A few Canadian provinces have passed their own FRLs to 
sustain fiscal discipline and to improve their credit ratings.
14 
Table  1 summarizes how various countries have handled the issues of which 
government passes the law and which it applies to. With either type of law, enforcement 
is an issue.  There is difference, however, between a government trying to discipline itself 
with a law that it has the power to change and a higher -level government disciplines a 
lower-level  government  that  has  some political  independence.  In  the  latter  type  of 
arrangement, it remains uncertain whether the national government will have the tools 
and political determination to enforce the law.    When the national government passes an 
FRL law that does not directly prescribe what the SNGs must do, a key question is 
whether the SNGs follow the federal example and pass and obey their own laws.  Given 
the complex variety of intergovernmental systems, there is no single optimal recipe for 
which level of the government can or should pass the FRL and to which level of 
government it should apply.   
In the US and Canada the political tradition of state and provincial autonomy and 
independence, along with consistent no-bail policy by the center, has existed from the 
19
th  century  and  has  generally  instilled  subnational  fiscal  discipline  through  ex  post 
consequences.  The explicit institutional responses have been at the state and provincial 
level, with their own laws or constitutional amendments to set ex ante constraints to keep 
the  subnational  governments  out  of  trouble  (Inman  2003;  Wallis,  Sylla,  and  Grinath 
                                                 
13 Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) argue that such top-down control is necessary for SN fiscal discipline in 
developing countries.  Rodden and Eskeland (2003), with more evidence to consider, see prospects for 
combining hierarchical control with market discipline, and gradually letting the latter take more weight. 




2004).  Neither federal government has an FRL pertaining to the SNGs.  No US state has 
an FRL, although most have more or less strict limits on state borrowing and deficits, 
with origins back to the 19
th century.  The federal government does not have enough 
sway to force an FRL upon them.    
 
Table 1: Which Government Passed FRL and To Which Levels Does It Apply? 
IV.    National FRL applies 
to all levels, usually 
more strictly to SNGs 
National 
FRL applies only to 
national level 
SNGs with own FRLs 
Federal constitution       
Brazil  X     
India    X  X 
Argentina  X 2004  X 1999  X (some in 1999) 
Canada/1      X 
Australia    X  X 
       
Unitary constitution       
Colombia  X     
Peru  X     
Note: 1/The national government passed a law controlling federal spending. 
Brazil’s FRL was passed by the national government for all levels of government; 
it uses both ex ante rules and legal penalties to contribute to the consolidation of a critical 
mass of consensus for fiscal prudence among powerful governors who had few party 
loyalties but strong influence over national legislators.  Colombia, a unitary country of 
―autonomous‖  departments,  already  had  various  laws  constraining  subnational 
borrowing, and to get more institutional backing for fiscal balance at the national level 
they passed an explicit FRL in 2003.  It adds to the ex ante constraints on SNGs and sets 
up transparency  and accountability procedures  for encouraging fiscal  prudence at  the 
national level.  
Peru has had a national-level FRL since 2000, and then in 2002-2003 municipal 
and regional governments got elections and obtained substantial de jure fiscal autonomy, 
including the right to borrow.  Therefore, the government revised the FRL in 2003, with 
provisions  for  the  SNGs  as  well  as  tighter  constraints  on  national  fiscal  behavior.  
Argentina  has  gone  through  several  FRL  arrangements  without  success.  The  1999 
national government’s FRL was only directly for the national government and called for 
provinces to pass their own FRLs, which some did but some others did not, including the 
largest province.  In the fiscal crisis of 2000-01 and beyond, both the federal and SNGs 
missed the FRL targets and the laws seemed irrelevant. In 2004, the national government 
passed an FRL that applied to all levels.  The federal government and SNGs were missing 
the targets even before the 2008-2009 world financial crisis, however, and in 2009 the 




IV.  Content of FRLs 
This  section  analyzes  the  content  of  FRLs  relating  to  SNGs  in  Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, and Peru.  The analysis is organized along 
three dimensions: procedural rules for transparency and accountability, fiscal targets – 
quantitative or qualitative, and enforcement and escape clauses.  Annex 1 presents a more 
detailed summary of the content of FRLs along these dimensions
15.  For Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru, the analysis is on the unified FRL that applies to the SNGs. For Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, and India, subnational FRLs are presented.  
In general, there is greater convergence among countries on the procedural rules 
and fiscal targets, and more variability on the escape clause and enforcement.  All FRLs 
call for the processes of budget formulation and execution that increase transparency and 
rationality.  Many FRLs require medium-term fiscal frameworks. Almost all FRLs have 
explicit fiscal targets – fiscal deficit, debt, or both, or other variables such as operating 
budget balance. In some FRLs,  additional variables are targeted, such as expenditure 
growth and composition.   
A.  Procedural rules for transparency and accountability 
All  FRLs  in  the  countries  discussed  call  for  processes  that  increase  the 
transparency and rationality of formulating and executing the budget. Typically the FRL 
requires annual publication and legislative discussion of a fiscal plan and budget, and 
often this is for multiple years on a rolling basis.  The presentation may have to include 
full costing of any new spending programs or tax changes.  Fiscal transparency includes 
having an audit of subnational financial accounts, making periodic public disclosures of 
key fiscal data, or exposing hidden liabilities.    The FRLs also vary in the extent to which 
they control arrears and the deficits of off-budget entities, like companies owned wholly 
or largely by SNGs.      
The  requirements  for  a  medium-term  fiscal  framework  and  a  transparent 
budgetary process aim to ensure that fiscal accounts move within a sustainable debt path 
and that fiscal adjustment takes a medium-term approach to better respond to shocks and 
differing trajectories for key macroeconomic variables that affect subnational finance. 
The transparent budgetary process affords debates by executive and legislative branches 
on spending priorities, funding sources, and required fiscal adjustments.  
To  a  large  degree  the  effectiveness  of  these  requirements  depends  on  how 
diligently the legislature and the press monitor these publications and compliance with 
them.    The  discipline  and  sanctions  from  the  political  pressures  and  the  access  to 
information  about  commitments  and  subsequent  compliance  can  help  enforce  FRLs.  
Credit markets can also help with discipline by imposing risk premiums and raising the 
                                                 
15 Argentina,  Australia,  Canada,  and  India  are  the  countries  with  subnational  FRLs.  Most  Argentine 
provinces have adopted the FRL, which was drafted jointly with the Federal Government, except 3 out of 
24 which have their own provincial one.  Canada has 13 provinces.  The discussion in the paper and Annex 
1 covers 9 provinces, which account for over 99 percent of population.  Australia has six states and two 
major mainland territories. India has 28 states. As the content of FRL is broadly similar across 26 states 




cost  of  borrowing  if  there  is  fiscal  misbehavior.  The  countries  with  FRLs  under 
discussion are all democracies, but they vary in how well their institutions function to 
achieve accountability. 
Brazil’s  FRL  sets  minimum  standards  for  state  budgeting,  personnel 
management, and debt management.  The annual budget prepared by each SNG has to be 
consistent  with  its  multiyear  budget  plan  and  with  the  federal  fiscal  and  monetary 
program.  The FRL systematizes and reinforces the restrictions on personnel spending, 
deficits and debt that were in the state debt rescheduling agreements and other earlier 
measures (Law 9496 and the Senate resolutions).  The accrual accounting method for all 
levels of the government eliminates an important source of hidden liabilities: arrears. It 
also contains specific limits on spending commitments by governments in their final year 
in office.   
In  Brazil,  moreover,  article  48  of  Brazil’s  Fiscal  Responsibility  Law  (2000) 
enshrines fiscal transparency as a key component of the new framework. Proposals, laws, 
and accounts are to be widely distributed, including through the use of electronic media 
(all  reports  are  on  the  government  website).  Article  54  requires  that  all  levels  of 
governments publish a quarterly fiscal management report that contains the major fiscal 
variables and indicates compliance with fiscal targets. Pursuant to article 57, this report is 
to be certified by the audit courts. 
In Colombia, the FRL specifies the process for setting budget targets and linking 
them to target ranges for debts and deficits.  Regulations for the law institutionalized the 
practice at the national level and in some SNGs of publishing quarterly fiscal results, 
defining deficits on the basis of cash revenue and accrual of spending obligations, and 
defining  debt  to  include  floating  debt.    The  FRL  set  a  target  to  eliminate  reservas 
presupuestales (pre-committed expenditures) in two years, which was done.  The other 
part of floating debt, accounts payable, were counted as regular debt and thus controlled 
by the fiscal/financial plan.  To help with fiscal discipline at all levels, the FRL prohibits 
the  national  government  from  lending  to  an  SNG  or  guaranteeing  its  debt  if  it is  in 
violation of Law 617 of 2000 or Law 357 of 1997, or if it is in arrears on any debt service 
to  the  national  government.    Indeed,  a  subnational  government  with  those  fiscal 
violations may not legally borrow from anyone.  To discourage electoral cycles in fiscal 
policy, the FRL prohibits any government from committing spending in future years or 
increasing personnel spending in an election year.  Departmental and municipal central 
administrations are not allowed to make transfers to their public entities. Strict limits 
apply to creation of new municipalities, and municipalities proven non-viable have to 
merge. 
In Peru the 2003 FRL built upon the 2000 FRL (Fiscal Prudence Law), extending 
it to SNGs.  It required that the annual fiscal deficit of the non-financial public sector not 
exceed the limit in the multi-annual fiscal framework and in any case would not exceed 
specific targets (discussed below). Each regional government must prepare and publish 
an  annual  development  plan  that  is  consistent  with  the  national  fiscal  framework 
(including  the  size  of  total  public  sector  deficit).  Quarterly  monitoring  of  the  fiscal 
performance is required and, in case of revenue shortfall, adequate remedies to revenues 




frameworks have to fit within the national one—whereas in some other countries the 
SNGs  fiscal  frameworks  merely  have to  be internally  consistent  and  are not  directly 
subordinated to the national government’s fiscal framework—this has not usually been a 
binding  constraint  in  Peru,  as  the  national  government  and  the  overall  general 
government have not hit the limit and ran surpluses in 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
Argentina’s  Fiscal  Solvency  Law  in  September  1999  called  for  limits  in  the 
growth  of  expenditures,  the  adoption  of  multi-year  budgeting,  creation  of  a 
Countercyclical  Fiscal  Fund,  and  various  transparency  measures  regarding  public 
finances—the features favored by the recent literature on fiscal rules.  The new FRL in 
2004  applies  to  the  provincial  as  well  as  national  levels  and  has  similar  procedural 
requirements—rolling 3-year budget plan with projection of revenue and spending by 
destination,  functional  and  economic  categories.    An  intergovernmental  commission 
coordinates  the  definitions  of  budget  categories  and  evaluates  budget  proposals.  The 
multiannual fiscal plans and results need to be published on the governments’ web pages 
(Melamud 2010). The law does not spell out coordination on some key items, like the 
national  government’s  specification  of  salary  increases  for  teachers,  which  provinces 
have to pay and which set the standard of pay demands by the rest of provincial workers.  
These  unfunded  mandates  effectively  derailed  provincial  spending  plans,  leaving 
provincial governments largely unable to control their fiscal situations.  Discretionary 
transfers  from  the  national  government  have  allowed  them  to  meet  their  payment 
obligations and kept made them more politically dependent. 
In India, FRLs passed by states typically require the state government present its 
medium-term  fiscal  plan  with  annual  budget  to  the  state  legislature.  The  fiscal  plan 
should set forth multi-year rolling targets for key fiscal indicators.  Some FRLs require 
that the state at the time of budget presentation disclose contingent liabilities created by 
guarantees provided to public sector undertakings, and some FRLs require the disclosure 
of borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India and liabilities on the state government for 
any separate legal entities.  Most FRLs require disclosure of significant changes in the 
accounting policies.   
In Australia, the procedural rules and transparency are expressed in varied terms 
across FRLs of states; this is in contrast to India where FRLs enacted by states have 
strikingly similar content.  But the over-archiving content of the FRLs across states in 
Australia centers on sound fiscal management, transparency in disclosing fiscal policy 
and accounts, and tabling of fiscal budgets to state legislature for oversight.  For example, 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2005) of New South Wales lays out the fiscal principles 
and targets for the state. In application of fiscal principles, the government should report 
in  annual  budget  papers:  an  assessment  of  past  and  prospective  long-term  average 
revenue growth; an assessment of the impact of budget measures in respect of expenses 
and revenue on long-term fiscal gaps; measures taken to reflect the fiscal principles; and 
the estimated impact of proposed tax policy changes. These principles are supported by 
the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 that requires the treasurer to: release publicly 
monthly statement and half year review setting out projections and year-to-date balances 
for the budget; table the annual budget in the Legislative Assembly; and present audited 




FRLs  of  provincial  governments  in  Canada  place  responsibility  and 
accountability with the provincial finance minister.  The finance minister must present a 
budget plan and annual report to the legislature of the provincial government and make 
these available to  the public, within prescribed deadlines.   Variations exist about  the 
exact nature of disclosure, for example, the public disclosure in Ontario includes mid-
year review of fiscal plan, updated information about revenues and expenses, long-range 
assessment of fiscal environment two years after provincial election, and pre-election 
reports under certain regulation.  In New Brunswick, each year the minister shall provide 
details as to how the public may participate in pre-budget consultations and shall make 
public  a  pre-budget  consultation  document  that  sets  out  the  key  fiscal  issues  for 
consideration.  
B.  Fiscal targets  
In addition to procedural rules and transparency, most FRLs reviewed here spell 
out fiscal targets for SNGs with the most common target being the deficit, and there are 
differences in the degree of specificity about other targets such as debt stock, spending 
and guarantees.   
Table 2 below summarizes  fiscal  targets  in  the FRLs  for SNGs  in  Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru.  As can be seen, fiscal targets are uniform for SNGs in 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru; this is not surprising as these countries each has a unified 
FRL applied to all levels of government.   
Table 2: Fiscal Responsibility Laws – Fiscal Targets for SNGs 
V.    Fiscal Targets 
Federal Constitution   
Argentina (2004)    Primary spending growth at or below the growth rate of national 
GDP. 
  Budget balances of provinces sufficient to bring debt service 
below 15% of current revenue, net of municipal transfers. 
Brazil     Personnel spending 60 percent or less of net fiscal revenue for 
states and municipalities, with ceilings for each branch of 
government 
  Compliance with targets in mandatory limits set by the Senate 
India (states)    Annual reduction of revenue deficit  
  Elimination of revenue deficit by certain date 
  Annual reduction of fiscal deficit  
  Fiscal deficit/GSDP <= 3 percent of GSDP 
  Limits on guarantees 
  Total liabilities <= 25-28 percent of GSDP 
Unitary Constitution   
Colombia    Interest payment/operational savings 
  Debt/current revenue 
Peru    Fiscal deficit of total non-financial public sector including SNGs 
no more than 1 percent of GDP.  
  Real growth of public sector spending including SNGs no more 




  Stock of debt for each SNG may not exceed 100 percent of the 
current revenue, and the debt service (interest and amortization) 
may not exceed 25 percent of the current revenue 
  The average primary balance of each SNG for the last 3 years 
may not be negative 
Note: Revenue deficit in India is the difference between total revenue and current expenditure.  
Sources: see Annex 1. 
As can be seen from the table (and Annex 1), fiscal targets differ across countries, 
and in some countries differ across SNGs.  There are two challenges in setting fiscal 
targets. First, how these targets relate to the threshold for fiscal and debt sustainability? 
To date, there are no agreed empirical thresholds for SNGs.   Second, how can uniform 
adjustment targets be compatible with horizontal equity if SNGs are starting off from 
different levels of development and with a large mandate (and backlog) of expenditures? 
This question will need to be related to the system of fiscal transfers with the intent to 
reduce horizontal inequality in service delivery.     
In  the  absence  of  market  discipline,  for  national  or  SNGs  to  do  this  for 
themselves—passing  a  law  stating  what  budget  they  have  to  pass—has  the  inherent 
weakness  that  the  same  legislative  body  that  would  pass  an  unbalanced  budget  (in 
violation of the law) could also vote to change the law. If the national FRL specifies 
fiscal ratios for the SNGs, however, this has more inherent strength, since it provides a 
legal basis for the higher level of government (and typically a source for fiscal transfers) 
to impose limits on the SNGs. These limits are typically about deficits, borrowing, debt 
stock, and/or debt service to fiscal revenue or GSDP.  Revenue is likely to be a more 
effective basis, since it is known sooner and with more precision than GSDP.   
Since the point of an FRL is to prevent the fiscal slippage from deterioration to 
insolvency, focus on ratios where the subnational government has more control over the 
denominator as well as the numerator (e.g., wage bill as a share of total spending) is more 
likely to have the desired effect than relying only on ratios, like debt service or debt stock 
to GSDP. These ratios are substantially influenced by exogenous factors (interest and 
exchange rate) and often go over the limit only after problems have gotten out of hand. 
In Brazil, the debt restructuring agreements between the federal government and 
the  states  in  1997  established  a  comprehensive  list  of  fiscal  targets—debt-to-revenue 
ratio,  primary  balance,  personnel  spending  as  share  of  total  spending,  own-source 
revenue growth, and investment ceilings—as well as a list of state-owned enterprises or 
banks  to  be  privatized  or  concessioned.    The  annual  budget  of  each  SNG  has  to  be 
consistent  with  its  multiyear  budget  plan  and  with  the  federal  fiscal  and  monetary 
program.  The FRL mandates Senate resolutions to set the specific targets for SNG debt 
and  fiscal  balances.    The  FRL  systematizes  and  reinforces  the  restrictions  on  fiscal 
variables such as personnel spending as a share of SNG net revenue and on borrowing 
(Annex A1).  It also contains specific provisions for authorities in their final  year in 
office.  These restrictions on the borrowers’ side were complemented by restrictions on 




In  Colombia,  the  Fiscal  Transparency  and  Responsibility  Law  (2003)  in 
combination with a modified version of the Traffic-Light Law (Law 358 of 1997) rates 
SNGs according to the ratios of debt to payment capacity, and SNGs rated in the red-light 
zone are prohibited from borrowing, and those in the green-light zone are permitted to 
borrow  up  to  limits  based  on  debt  sustainability  calculations.  Departments  and  large 
municipalities  must  get  satisfactory  credit  ratings  from  international  rating  agencies 
before they borrow (following the idea from a regulation in Mexico since 2000).   
 In Peru, the FRL limits the deficit of the total public sector 1 percent of GDP (or 
the amount in the national fiscal framework, whichever is less), except in congressionally 
authorized cases of national emergency or international crisis, when the deficit could go 
to 2.5 percent.
16  In addition, each SNG has to keep a non -negative primary balance on 
average for the last 3 years, and they may not have debt service over 25 percent of current 
revenue or debt stock over 100  percent.  In election years, the governments may not 
spend more than 60 percent of the annual spending allocation in the first 7 months and 
may not use more than 40 percent of the annual limit on the deficit in the first  half of 
fiscal  year. 
17  The  FRL  set s  some  ex  ante  procedural  constraints  for  subnational 
borrowing, and SNGs can only borrow internationally with the guarantee of the national 
government.  The guarantee for any loan requires compliance with the Annual Debt Law 
and demonstration of the capacity to pay, which provisions give the national government 
the authority to veto SNG borrowing.
18   
Fiscal targets adopted by Indian states are remarkably similar to each other with 
respect to fiscal and revenue deficits. Some states FRLs also place limits on guarantees.  
Basically,  in  the  early  2000s,  some  states  went  ahead  of  the  federal  government  in 
enacting Fiscal Responsibility and Financial Management Act (e.g. Karnataka in 2002). 
The federal act in 2003 has similar fiscal targets as those in these early reforming states. 
Subsequently, the 12
th Finance Commission mandated fiscal responsibility legislation for 
all states, with revenue deficit (total revenue minus current expenditures) to be eliminated 
and the fiscal deficit to be reduced to 3 percent of GSDP by fiscal year 2009. Some states 
issued  additional  legislation  on  fiscal  targets,  for  example  the  Kerala  Ceiling  on 
Government Guarantee Act (2003) that was enacted the same year as its FRL. According 
to the guarantee act, the guarantee outstanding for any fiscal year shall not exceed rupees 
fourteen thousand crores,
19 no government guarantee shall be given to private entity, and 
the Guarantee Redemption Fund shall be established. 
                                                 
16 The 2000 (pre-decentralization) version of the FRL had such a restriction on general government fiscal 
balances, implicitly including SNGs; the 2003 FRL made the application to SNGs explicit. 
17 Subsequent legislation has made minor modifications to these limits, but not undermined their intent.  
For instance, in 2007 and 2008 (Law Nos. 29035 and 291 44) the restriction on the growth of the non -
financial expenditure was changed to ―annual real growth of the consumption expenditure of the central 
government‖, which may not exceed 4%, using the inflationary target from the central bank. 
18 SNGs are not prohibited from getting domestic credit without the guarantee, but this must come within 
the overall public sector deficit constraint.  Thus, the national government could use the requirements for 
getting credit with the guarantee and other means to force SNGs to report their non- guaranteed borrowing 
and to keep it within the total deficit constraint.  With multiple channels of control at their disposal, the 
national Ministry of Economics and Finance has keep SNG borrowing under tight control. 




In contrast to India where fiscal targets with respect to revenue and fiscal deficits 
are similar across states, states in Australia do not have similar fiscal targets.  The fiscal 
targets in New South Wales differ from those in Queensland.  The Fiscal Responsibility 
Act  of  2005  in  New  South  Wales  sets  forth  the  following  targets:  Reduce  general 
government net financial liabilities to <= 7.5 percent of GSDP by June 30, 2010; and to 
<= 6 percent by June 30, 2015; maintain general government net debt <= 0.8 percent of 
GSDP, and eliminate total state sector unfunded superannuation liabilities by June 30, 
2020.   The Charter of Fiscal Responsibility of 2009 in Queensland sets forth a quite 
different set of fiscal targets: the General Government sector meets all operating expenses 
from operating revenue; growth in own-purpose expenses in the General Government 
sector to not exceed real per capital growth; achieve a General Government net operating 
surplus  no  later  than  2015-2016;  stabilize  net  financial  liabilities  as  a  proportion  of 
revenue in the Non-financial Public Sector; and target full funding of long-term liabilities 
such as superannuation in accordance with actuarial advice.  
FRLs in the Australian states of Western Australia and Northern Territory have 
only one fiscal target stipulating that funding for current services to be provided by the 
current  revenue  generation.    The  states  of  Victoria  and  Tasmania  do  not  have  fiscal 
targets,  but  their  FRLs  have  established  financial  management  principles  including: 
prudent management of financial risks; spending and taxing policies to be formulated to 
maintain  a  reasonable  degree  of  stability  and  predictability;  and  ensuring  that  policy 
decisions have regard to their financial effects on future generations. These principles are 
also established by the states of Western Australia and Northern Territory.  
Fiscal  targets  vary  across  Canadian  provinces,  as  shown  in  Annex  2.  Most 
provinces require a balanced budget.  British Colombia requires only the balance budget 
rule while Quebec allows fiscal deficit but no more than the accumulated fiscal surplus in 
previous  years.    Other  provinces  such  as  Alberta,  Ontario  and  New  Brunswick  also 
require  additional  fiscal  targets  relating  to  debt  ratio,  net  assets,  or  contingency 
allowance. 
In Argentina the FRL (2004) says that budgets for primary spending (current and 
capital, net of interest cost) may not grow faster than the rate of growth of the national 
GDP, as foreseen in the national macroeconomic framework (also called for in the FRL, 
as mentioned above).  If GDP growth is negative, then the primary spending may not 
grow, but does not have to shrink. The limitation on primary spending is weakened by 
important exceptions: namely, any investment spending for basic social infrastructure, 
spending financed by international organization, and spending paid with unused revenue 
from  previous  years.    Borrowing  does  have  an  aggregate  limit  in  that  debt  service 
(projected)  may  not  exceed  15  percent  of  revenue  (net  of  participation  transfers 
earmarked for the municipalities).  Nonetheless, the outcomes have been mixed and often 
less favorable than in the possibly optimistic projections, putting some provinces over the 
15 percent limit.  Furthermore, as a result of the recession that accompanied the global 
downturn  in  2009,  Congress  derogated  key  fiscal  targets  for  2010  and  2011;  and  in 
particular those setting ceilings on current primary spending growth, the overall primary 
fiscal balance, and new borrowing (Law 26.530).  Such a temporary suspension reflects 




public spending when facing adverse external or domestic shocks; and second, the need 
to save in the counter-cyclical fund when the provincial economies are in expansion, 
which did not happen. This legal initiative was also accompanied by another Programa 
Federal de Desendeudamiento (Decree No.60/2010) that allows restructuring of eligible 
provincial debts, affected by the deterioration of their fiscal balances. Up to the end of 
August 2010, about eighteen provinces had benefitted from such programs.        
C.  Enforcement and escape clause 
Rules  are  only  as  good  as  their  enforcement,  and  FRLs  vary  in  terms  of  the 
strength of enforcement called for in the law and in terms of how well the governments 
implement the law in practice.  On the enforcement and escape clauses, there is great 
variability across countries, and within country in the case of Canada.   
The enforcement ranges from no specific enforcement clause in the case of states 
FRLs in Australia and most provinces in Canada to strict enforcement in the case of 
Brazil, Colombia, Peru and three provinces in Canada. Indian states broadly follows the 
sanction  clause  in  the  national  FRL  that  whenever  there  is  a  breaching  of  intra-year 
targets  of  revenues  and  expenditures,  the  state  government  should  take  appropriate 
measures for increasing revenues and/or reducing expenditures, including curtailment of 
the sums authorized to be paid and applied from out of the Consolidated Fund of the 
state. However there is no specific timeframe for meeting the targets.  
 More strict sanctions on the SNGs can be found in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and 
three provinces in Canada. In Brazil, the FRL reiterates from earlier laws the requirement 
that if an SNG’s debt is over the legal limit it may not borrow (except for refinancing) 
and would no longer receive ―voluntary‖ transfers from the federal government (transfers 
not from tax-sharing participations). Debt and labor contracts in violation of the FRL are 
not legally valid, which would be a negative ex post consequence for any lender who thus 
would lose its money.  The Fiscal Crimes Law (LCF), a companion law to the FRL 
specifies criminal penalties—fines and even jail—for officials who violate the rules. The 
LCF applies to public officials of all branches of government at all levels. Among other 
provisions, the LCF provides for detention of up to four years for a public official who 
engages in credit operations without prior legislative authorization, incurs unauthorized 
expenditure commitments (including any in the last two quarters in office that cannot be 
repaid during the present term of office), extends loan guarantees without collateral of 
equal or higher value, increases personnel expenditures during the final 180 days of the 
term of office, or issues unregistered public debt (IMF 2001).  
The  Colombia  unified  FRL  imposes  strict  sanctions  on  SNGs  for  their  non-
compliance with FRL. When SNGs do not comply with the limits imposed by the FRL, 
they will be prohibited from borrowing. They also have to adopt a fiscal-rescue program 
to regain viability within the next two years. The governments must make across the 
board spending cuts whenever actual non-earmarked current revenues are come in lower 
than in the budget estimates.  Sanctions are also imposed on lenders. The law tightens the 
regulations  on  the  supply  side.  It  prohibits  lending  by  the  national  government  to  a 
subnational entity or guaranteeing its debt if the subnational is in violation of Law 617 or 




lending to subnationals by financial institutions and territorial development institutions 
must meet the conditions and limits of various regulations such as law 358, law 617, and 
law 817. Otherwise the credit contract is invalid and borrowed funds must be restituted 
promptly without interest or any other charges (FRL Art. 21).  
  In Peru, violation of the FRL targets or some other legal targets by SNGs will 
cause the temporary disruption of transfers from participatory funds, such as FONCOR, 
FONCOMUN, and FIDE, which are block grants to regional and communal governments 
and  are  set  by  a  formula  that  favors  localities  with  a  higher  share  of  low-income 
population.  
The  two  Canadian  provinces  that  have  sanctions  are  British  Colombia  and 
Manitoba.  In British Columbia, the members of the executive council are subject to a 20 
percent pay cut when fiscal targets are not met. The cut can be partially or fully restored 
when fiscal targets are met. In Manitoba, if fiscal balance at the end of year is negative, 
ministerial salaries are cut by 20 percent in the first year and 40 percent in the second 
year  if  the  deficit  continues.    Ontario  has  similar  sanctions  of  cutting  the  salary  of 
Executive Council members when deficit target is missed.   
In Argentina, the FRL (2004) does not have strong sanctions on the SNGs or 
their  lenders.  Furthermore,  it  allows  the  Federal  Council  of  Fiscal  Responsibility 
discretion to decide which of the possible sanctions to apply (Art. 32).  If an SNG’s debt 
service exceeds the limit, then it may not borrow except to rollover existing debt on more 
favorable terms and as part of a fiscal adjustment program, perhaps with a multilateral 
international lender.  Provincial governments that miss the fiscal targets in their macro 
frameworks have faced little political fallout; it has been easy to shift blame to the overall 
macro situation and to unfunded mandates from the national government.  As has been 
the case all along in Argentina, creditors can make a prior claim on the participation 
transfers to get the debt service due, which leaves them with little concern as to whether 
or not their provincial client is within the bounds of the FRL.  
  With regard to escape clauses, none of the Australian states contain it.  Brazil and 
Peru FRLs and FRLs by Indian states have escape clause to relax fiscal targets and debt 
ceilings in the event of calamity and less than 1 percent economic growth for the last four 
quarters  (Brazil),  negative  growth  and  national  emergency  (Peru,  Article  5),  national 
security or natural calamity or exceptional grounds (Indian states). Escape clause differs 
across Canadian provinces, with some provinces do not have one, while some provinces 
has  escape  clause  in  the  event  of  major  disaster  or  extraordinary  circumstances. 
Colombia’s FRL does not have an explicit escape clause. Nor does Argentina’s FRL, 
although  the  congress  did  suspend  key  provisions  of  the  FRL  during  the  2008-2009 
global financial crisis.  
Rules also need to take into account exogenous shocks—like a global recession—
and allow some accommodation, without undermining the fiscal discipline.  The ongoing 
global economic crisis has pressured sovereign and sub-sovereign finance, which has led 
some countries to apply the escape clause.  The extent of the full response will need to be 
reviewed.   A key question during a macroeconomic crisis, such as the 2008-2009 global 




stimulus or loosen the fiscal constraints for subnational governments.  For example, the 
Thirteenth Finance Commission in India recommended that the central government be 
the one bearing the cost of the crisis and the states should receive assistance from the 
centre for providing the stimulus.    
V.  FRLs in Broader Institutional Context for Fiscal Prudence 
FRLs do not operate alone, nor are FRLs sufficient to enforce fiscal discipline. To 
understand the role of FRLs in enforcing fiscal discipline, it helps to know the range of 
institutional tools available for this purpose and to know what other institutions for fiscal 
discipline exist, including the overall incentive structure and enforcement capabilities for 
subnational and national governments and their creditors.    
A.  Lender-borrower nexus and timing of controls and sanctions 
Deficits and debt arise from the joint decision of governments and their creditors 
(including suppliers allowing extended payments). These decisions are made in light of 
not only the rules governing issuance of the debt, but also the ex ante expectations about 
what will happen to the debtor and the creditors if payment difficulties arise—who will 
lose money or who will be forced into painful adjustment.  The decisions of that lending 
moment become a fait accompli conditioning the subsequent decisions.  This points to 
two important dimensions of control of government borrowing. First the type or timing—
ex ante controls or ex post consequences; and second whether the ex ante controls and ex 
post consequences act on borrowers or lenders.  Together these make a matrix with four 
cells, as in Table 3 below.  
Traditionally  the  fiscal  discipline  literature  has  focused  on  the  first  column—
constraints and incentives of borrowers.  Ex ante constraints on subnational borrowers 
include debt and deficit ceilings, restrictions on international borrowing, and regulation 
of SNGs’ borrowing based on fiscal-capacity criteria. Typically an FRL includes these, 
but also includes more such as the public finance process and procedural rules that may 
lead to debt.   
To complement the ex ante constraints and to make them credible, there need to 
be ex post consequences for failures in fiscal prudence.  Practices to impose ex post 
consequences  on  SNGs  include  limits  or  prohibitions  on  central  bank  financing,  no 
bailouts (from central government or from international community) or debt workouts 
without adequate conditionality, requirements to publish detailed fiscal results, refusal by 
the central government to accept SNG debt, and withholding debt service from transfers 








Table 3: Lender-Borrower Nexus and Timing of Controls and Sanctions 
Channels for Control of Deficits and Debt 
  For Borrowers  





Debt and deficit ceilings 
Restrictions on international borrowing 
Publication of detailed fiscal results 
SNGs only 
Regulation of SNGs’ borrowing, based on 
fiscal-capacity criteria (regulations by central 
government or SNG itself, central bank, or 
other institution) 
All governments 
No direct central bank financing 
Regulations by central bank or 
other financial supervision agency 
SNGs only 
Cap on total borrowing by SNGs 
Increased capital requirements for 




Limits on central bank financing 
No bailouts (from central government or 
from international community) and no debt 
workout without adequate conditionality 
Publication of detailed fiscal results 
SNGs only 
Central government does not accept SNG 
debt 




-  Strong supervision of banks  
SNGs only 
-  Regulations require capital 
write-offs for losses from 
SNG debt  
-  No central bank bailouts 
-  Well-functioning financial 
market can increase risk 
premium for uncreditworthy 
borrowers 
 
Some countries have also a formal insolvency system for SNGs (Canuto and Liu, 
2010, Liu and Waibel 2009).  The experience of Brazil in the 1990s shows that ex ante 
constraints, which abounded, were not sufficient by themselves.  Borrowers and lenders 
colluded extravagantly to evade the rules as long as ex post bailouts were forthcoming. 
The 1997 debt restructuring agreement between the federal government and 25 states had 
the  federal  government  took  over  the  states’  debt  but  requiring  states  carry  out  far-
reaching fiscal reforms and in compliance with the fiscal targets.  In Argentina in the 
1990s, on the other hand, there were few ex ante constraints, and the experience with 
pulling  provinces  into  line  in  the  fiscal  crisis  of  the  mid-1990s  by  use  of  ex  post 
consequences—mainly withholding debt service from transfers—seemed to validate the 
government’s choice to focus on ex post rather than ex ante measure.  By the end of the 
1990s, however, many provinces built up such debts and off-budget obligations that in 
the 2000s  the government  started opting for conditional bailouts,  rather than pay the 
political cost of imposing hard consequences (Dillinger and Webb 1999, Rodden 2003, 
Webb 2003).   
Without lenders there is no borrowing or debt, so their constraints and incentives 
deserve equal attention.  Lenders are not always automatically prudent enough, as many 
episodes  reveal,  including  the  financial  crisis  events  unfolding  in  2008.    Banking 
regulations can restrain lenders behavior, but lenders would view government borrowers 
as riskless if the central government or central bank ultimately guarantees the debt, and 




tax).    In  the  case  of  Brazil,  in  addition  to  FRL,  decisive  factors  include  the  debt 
renegotiation contracts and the constraints to the credit supply by banks and especially by 
public banks to SNGs.   
Regulations as listed in the top right box attempt to constrain such moral hazards 
ex  ante:  no  direct  central  bank  financing,  restrictions  on  international  borrowing, 
increased capital requirements for lending to risky SNGs, and borrowing cap for lending 
to SNGs. Rules and practices can also punish risky lender behavior ex post, such as by 
having strong supervision of banks, raising capital ratios for loan from entities with poor 
capital ratings, requiring capital write-offs for losses from SNG debt, and providing no 
bailouts  from  the  national  treasury  or  central  bank.  Relying  on  constraints  only  on 
borrowers means that lenders still have incentives to push loans and may find reckless or 
desperate politicians willing to borrow despite the rules.  This happened in the 1990s in 
Colombia,  when  laws  aimed  to  constrain  subnational  borrowing,  but  financial  sector 
regulation loosened for some years, and then some departments got excessive lending.  In 
the 2000s, the government addressed the problem by tightening both the financial sector 
regulation and the legal controls on the SNGs, with the 2003 FRL and other measures. 
   Ex ante regulation may not be purely on the borrower side. To improve fiscal 
transparency, Mexico introduced a credit rating system for SNGs. Although subnational 
participation  in  the  credit  rating  is  voluntary,  the  requirements  of  the  capital-risk 
weighting of bank loans introduced in 2000 and of loss provisions introduced in 2004 aim 
at imposing subnational fiscal discipline through the market pricing of subnational credit. 
In Colombia, the Fiscal Transparency and Responsibility Law (2003) also tightened the 
regulations on the supply side. Lending to SNGs by financial institutions and territorial 
development institutions must meet the conditions and limits of various regulations, such 
as Law 617 and Law 817. Otherwise, the credit contract is invalid and borrowed funds 
must be restituted promptly without interest or any other charges.   
Ideally, any lending should  be subject  to  at  least  some constraints  in  all four 
quadrants.  Relying only on ex ante constraints, without ex post consequences, gives 
irresponsible borrowers and lenders a big incentive to get around the ex ante rules and do 
transactions that will latter get bailed out, as happened in Brazil prior to the late 1990s.  
Relying only on ex post consequences allows irresponsible (and large) entities to build up 
such large debts that the national government will not have the political will to enforce 
the consequences, as it happened in Argentina in the late 1990s.  Ex ante constraints are 
important in economies where banks and financial institutions are owned by governments 
or  financial  markets  do  not  respond  appropriately  to  indicators  of  risk.  Under  such 
conditions,  credit-allocation  decisions  are  driven  more  by  considerations  of  political 
expediency than of fiscal prudence.  The events of 2008 also showed the importance of 
ex ante constraints (or the cost of their absence) even with private and liberalized capital 
markets.   
It must be emphasized that the purpose of ex ante and ex post controls is not to 
minimize  the  debt  financing,  instead  they  should  be  developed  with  the  objective  of 
promoting sustainable debt financing through a competitive and diversified subnational 




credits.  Debt financing is extremely important for infrastructure development where the 
maturity of assets often cannot be matched by the current terms of taxation and transfers.  
B.  Broader public finance legislation 
In so far as FRL as a fiscal legislation, it is not the only legal framework that 
imposes  fiscal  discipline  on  SNGs.  There  are  broader  public  finance  laws  such  as  a 
balanced budget law which various countries have adopted to the same effect. 
  As a federal country, each state in the United States sets limits for itself and for its 
local governments. Legal frameworks, laws, and regulations vary by state. Some of the 
common elements include: debt financing must be for a public (not private) purpose; debt 
limits are specified in laws/state constitutions to avoid excessive borrowing; debt limits 
may not apply to bonds payable from a ―special fund,‖ but the issuance of such bonds 
follow  a  separate  set  of  regulations;  governmental  accounting  standards  (GAAP)  are 
established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (www.gasb.org) with each 
state determining what accounting standards they and their local governments will use; 
and all meetings of a majority of the members of a governing body of an issuer must be 
open to the public.
20  In the United States, markets play a vital role in fiscal surveillance.   
  Another example is Poland, where the Public Finance Law (2005) specifies that: 
SNG debt as percentage of its total revenues no more than 60 percent; SNG debt service 
as percent of its total revenue no more than 15 percent; if SNG debt as percent of revenue 
reaches 55 percent, then the debt service as percent of revenues cannot be more than 12 
percent; and debt service needs to include guarantee payments for a given budget year 
even if the guarantees are not recalled. 
The  South  African  Municipal  Finance  Management  Act,  enacted  in  2003, 
contains a new framework for municipal finance and borrowing. Chapter 13 of the Act 
spells out detailed criteria for interventions and recovery plans, specifies the role of 
national  and  p rovincial  governments  and  courts  in  the  insolvency  mechanism,  and 
outlines the fiscal and debt adjustment process.  The act defines one set of fiscal 
indicators for ―serious financial problems,‖ and another for ―persistent material breach of 
financial commitments.‖  If the first set of triggers is met, the provincial government may 
intervene.  Under  the  second  set  of  triggers,  provincial  intervention  is  mandatory. 
Unsuccessful  provincial  intervention  calls  for  national  government  intervention.  
Interwoven with these interventions, the municipal government can apply to the High 
Court to stay all legal  proceedings  against the municipal government,  and to relieve, 
suspend  or  discharge  financial  obligations.  Only  courts  can  stay  debt  payments  and 
discharge debt obligations. 
  From the experience of Australia, Brazil, Canada, and India, FRLs become an 
important institution as the previous existing public finance or other legislation had not 
been able to contain the fiscal risks including those of SNGs.  FRLs become a vehicle of 
political debates in these countries where the broader macroeconomic environment and 
fiscal crises had made FRLs a more focused instrument for fiscal reforms.  In the case of 
                                                 




Colombia, various laws (e.g., 358, 617) were developed  dealing with different aspects of 
fiscal frameworks, and later FRL (2003) became a unifying framework to include not 
only key elements of the previous laws but also new elements.  In Peru, the beginning of 
the decentralization in the early 2000s incorporated the lessons in Argentina and Brazil, 
and  the  FRL  was  enacted  with  a  key  objective  of  preventing  fiscal  risks  of 
decentralization.    Argentina  has  tried  to  follow  the  South  American  trend  in  passing 
FRLs,  but  it  has  not  developed  the  same  national  consensus  in  favor  of  fiscal 
sustainability. 
VI.  Effects from an FRL 
Since countries passed FRLs (some in the mid- to late 1990s and some in the 
2000s),  some  evidence  has  accumulated  on  their  effectiveness.  Although  political 
consensus for fiscal prudence is clearly a necessary condition to launch a successful FRL, 
the test of its effective implementation comes when another party comes to power or 
when the consensus otherwise breaks down, and then one sees whether the institution 
works to help the remaining stabilization champions restrain the fiscal excesses that the 
populists  might  want.    The  evidence  at  most  allows  us  to  see  whether  there  is  an 
association  of  FRLs  and  fiscal  outcome,  to  see  the  extent  to  which  FRLs  have 
institutionalized  commitments  (often  pre-existing)  to  fiscal  responsibility,  and  to  see 
some patterns in the relationship between national and subnational fiscal rules. Of course 
the fiscal outcomes depend on many factors besides the FRL—GDP growth, international 
interest  rates,  etc.—which  this  analysis  does  not  reflect.    There  are  not  enough 
observations and degrees of freedom to use regression analysis to take account of these 
factors. 
A.  FRL and fiscal outcomes 
Given  the  lender-borrower  nexus  and  various  channels  that  would  influence 
government fiscal deficits and indebtedness, it would be difficult to precisely separate 
and measure the effects of FRL.  Nonetheless, to the extent that FRL intends to improve 
government finance and avoid over-indebtedness, it is worthwhile to ascertain if the FRL 
has been associated with improved fiscal outcomes.
21  
Here  we  choose  the  growth  of  public  debt  before  and  after the passing  of 
subnational FRL in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, and India, as shown in Annex 
3.
22  As each SNG may have passed its FRL in different year, the m easurement of the 
fiscal improvement/deterioration needs to be normalized. T represents the year when the 
FRL is passed.  Dt represents total subnational (state or province) gross debt outstanding 
over gross subnational domestic product (GSDP) in year t.  The growth of debt/GSDP in 
                                                 
21 Corbacho and Schwartz (2007) discuss the problems of determining the direction of causality.  Their 
study compared national fiscal deficits in countries with and without FRLs, and found that the former had 
smaller deficits.  Data on subnational deficits for such cross-country comparisons, however, are not readily 
available. 
22 We are not evaluating the impact of FRL on Peru, as the country enacted the 2003 FRL that applies to 
SNGs at the  same time as the decentralization.  In the case of Argentina, extreme macroeconomic 
instability and changes in the price level make it difficult to use the debt ratio as an indicator of fiscal 




the pre-FRL period is measured as the difference between the debt/GSDP in year t-1 and 
the debt/GSDP in year t-5, before the passing of the FRL in year t.  Similarly the growth 
of  debt/GSDP  in  the  post-FRL  period  is  measured  as  the  difference  between  the 
debt/GSDP in year t+5 and the debt in the year t when the FRL is passed. To leave out 
the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the post-FRL data will cover up to 
end 2007.
23 
In Australia, the growth of debt/GSDP is negative for all the states in the sample 
in the pre-FRL five-year period as well as in the post-FRL period (Table A3.1).  The 
debt/GSDP of Western Australia and Northern Territory continued to decline at faster 
pace  and  that  for  Victoria,  Queensland  and  New  South  Wales  continued  to  decline, 
although at a slower pace in the post-FRL period.  The states in the table passed FRLs 
from  2000-2005,  but  fiscal  consolidation  started  in  the  1990s  (e.g.,  South  Wales 
committing to long-term fiscal targets in 1994, and Victoria’s Financial Management Act 
in 1994). As noted before, the combined state and Commonwealth general government 
net debt had not exceeded 30 percent of GDP in the 1990s (Simes, 2003).  
In Brazil, although the growth of debt/GDP for SNGs was positive for both the 
pre  and  post-FRL  periods,  the  growth  slowed  down  from  5.0  percent  to  1.3  percent 
(Table A3.2).  The slowdown also happened to the federal government.    
In  Canada,  all  the  provinces  had  declining  debt  as  share  of  GSDP  after  the 
passing of the FRLs (Table A3.3). In British Colombia and Nova Scotia, this decline 
reversed the trend of rising debt as share of GSDP in the pre-FRL period, with British 
Colombia experienced the largest turnaround.  The other three provinces already had 
declining  debt  share  of  GSDP  for  the  FRL.  The  debt/GSDP  of  Newfoundland  and 
Labrador continued to decline in the post-FRL period at a faster speed, and of Alberta, 
Ontario and New Brunswick continued the reduction but at a slower pace. 
In Colombia, the debt/GSDP ratio rose from 2 percent in 1996 (the year before 
the traffic light Law 358) to 3.5 percent in 2001. The ratio steadily declined to 1.5 percent 
by 2006 and stayed at this level since (Table A3.4, Figure A4.4).   
In Indian states, the growth of debt /GSDP was slower in the post-FRL period 
than the pre-FRL period for 24 out of 26 states.  Twenty one out of these 24 states had 
reversed the trend of increasing debt/GSDP in the pre-FRL period (Table A3.5).   
From the above, FRL per se was not the pivotal moment for the turnaround of 
fiscal  deterioration  in  Australia  and  Canada.  In  fact,  legislating  and  regulating 
subnational debt was well underway before the enactment of various subnational FRLs.  
As noted before, the fiscal consolidation grew out of policy debates in Australia in the 
1990s, before various states passing FRLs from 2000-2006.  In Canada, many SNGs 
adopted balanced-budget and/or debt reduction legislation in the 1990s (Millar 1997).
24  
The entire country was seriously undertaking fiscal corrections after r ating downgrades. 
                                                 
23 For a country with its fiscal year ending during the calendar year, the debt data will cover up to June 
2008. 
24 Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Northwest Territories, the 




In some provinces, FRLs later consolidated various prior laws (e.g., New Brunswick).   
In Australia, some states also enacted various public finance laws in the 1990s.   
One  common  trait  of  successful  FRLs  for  subnational  governments  is  the 
commitment  of  the  central  government  to  its  own  fiscal  prudence,  which  is  usually 
reinforced by the application of the FRL to the national as well as subnational level.  As 
shown in Annex 4, government debt as share of GDP declined, before the onset of the 
global financial crisis in 2008, for both the central and subnational governments as a 
whole since the early 2000 in Brazil and Colombia, since the late 1990s in Canada, and 
since the mid-1990s in Australia.  Although important factors such as solid economic 
growth  and  prudent  monetary  policies  contributed  to  the  good  macroeconomic 
performance  in  general,  the  commitment  to  FRLs  is  positively  associated  with  the 
declining debt ratio. Similarly in India, the debt over GDP declined since the early 2000s 
to 2008, and the central government debt over GDP stabilized. 
B.  FRL as a device to institutionalize fiscal responsibility 
As shown above, the post-FRL period has usually been marked by a positive 
turnaround in subnational fiscal performance (Brazil, Colombia, and India), or continuing 
improvement in fiscal consolidation (Australia and Canada).  The FRL could serve as a 
device to institutionalize the commitment to fiscal reforms in order to have it persist over 
time and through changes of government and parties. 
In Brazil, the FRL was passed in 2000 by a right-center national government with 
a  strong  commitment  to  fiscal  stability  for  itself  and  with  a  need  to  push  a  similar 
commitment for SNGs.  A key test has come and was passed when a Labor government 
subsequently  came  to  power  in  2002  and  maintained  that  commitment,  both  for  the 
national government and for enforcing the FRL for SNGs.  In 2009 Brazil achieved an 
investment-grade credit rating.  The fiscal reform and consolidation in Brazilian states are 
embedded in both the annual Programs of Fiscal Adjustment (PAF) between the federal 
government and the states since 1998 and the FRL since 2000.  In 2001, the debt of most 
major  municipalities  was  restructured  in  an  identical  fashion  to  the  1997  state  debt 
restructuring.  The debt restructurings of 1997 and 2001 were successful in improving the 
fiscal  balances  of  states  and  municipalities.  Within  18  months  the  states’  negative 
primary balances turned positive, averaging one percent of GDP in recent years, thereby 
contributing  to  the  improved  macroeconomic  conditions  in  Brazil.    One  state,  Minas 
Gerais, challenged the FRL rules in 1999, provoking a crisis, but the national government 
carried out the prescribed sanctions and the state got back into line.  Implementation of 
the  PAFs  and  FRL  played  a  vital  role  in  maintaining  macroeconomic  stability  and 
avoiding a systemic financial crisis in Brazil (World Bank, 2008).  
In India, introducing FRLs at the state and central government levels is associated 
with fiscal adjustment since early to mid 2000s. 
25 While institutional reforms such as the 
introduction  of  FRLs  cannot  substitute  for  the  policies  needed  to  realize  fiscal 
adjustment,  they  can  help  cataly ze  and  complement  fiscal  adjustment .  The 
implementation of FRL at the center ushered in an era of rule -based management of 
                                                 




public  finances.    The  enactment  of  FRLs  by  states,  through  the  federal  incentives, 
brought  an  element  of  discipline  into  budget-making  by  the  states.  These  reforms, 
together with higher economic growth, introduction of VAT, and increase in the states’ 
share in net central taxes, contributed to the improvement in the finance of the center and 
states from 2004/05 to 2007/08 (India Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2009).   
In Colombia, three periods are relevant: the period before the traffic-light law of 
1997, the period  with  the traffic-light  law but  not  the FRL,  and the period after the 
passage of the FRL in 2003.  The traffic-light law was passed in a moment of enthusiasm 
for better fiscal policy at local levels, but the enthusiasm did not last and subnational debt 
problems recurred, along with national level fiscal problems.  The FRL in 2003 reflected 
a reinvigorated commitment to fiscal responsibility and institutionalized it.  The president 
elected in 2010 is from the same party, and observers expect the new administration to 
continue the fiscal policy commitments of its predecessor.  
In Peru a centrist government passed the FRL in 2003 in order to make sure that 
the  new  decentralization  program  did  not  lead  to  macro  fiscal  problems.  The  next 
government  in  2006,  headed  by  the  president  and  left-leaning  party  that  had  led  the 
country  into  hyper  inflation  in  the  late  1980s,  but  they  have  continued  the  same 
responsible fiscal policy that the FRL had started to institutionalize during the previous 
administration.  Peru’s sovereign foreign currency rating was upgraded to investment 
grade first by Fitch and Standard and Poor’s in 2008 and then by Moody’s in 2009, 
reflecting the strong growth performance, prudent fiscal and liability management, and 
the resulting improvement in solvency indicators. 
In Argentina the 1999 FRL (and the provincial FRLs) stopped working in 2001 
because of the extreme mismatch between the national government’s fiscal and monetary 
policies in the context of a fixed exchange rate.  Although the federal government’s FRL 
lacked enforcement power, the more fundamental problem was the government’s many 
legally  inflexible  spending  obligations,  most  notably  debt  service  and  provincial 
transfers.  The provincial FRLs also had shortcomings that would have been problematic 
even if the collapse at the top had not come first.  They lacked enforcement power and a 
critical mass of states had not passed them.  The 2004 FRL, while more comprehensive 
than its predecessor, again did not reflect a national consensus that fiscal prudence was 
worth  political  sacrifice.    Compliance  was  incomplete  from  the  start,  sanctions  were 
weak, and the binding features of the law were suspended when an economic slowdown 
came in 2008-2009. 
Since an effective FRL is a means to institutionalize a consensus in favor of fiscal 
responsibility, it helps to have it grow out of a consensus-building process.  Brazil did 
this explicitly through discussions with the states and because the President who put 
through the law came to office on the basis of his success in taming deficits and inflation 
while he was Minister of Finance. In India the Finance Commission played a key role in 
building consensus on the fiscal policy agenda. In Brazil, Colombia, and Peru the painful 
memories of past fiscal excesses gave impetus for a political mandate to assure fiscal 
responsibility in the future.  It is unclear why this did not happen in Argentina, with its 
many painful macroeconomic failures, but the pro-stability consensus of the early 1990s 




The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 will provide an important test on the 
long-term commitment to fiscal sustainability.  Governments throughout the world have 
loosened the fiscal rules as part of counter-cyclical packages. For example, in Brazil, The 
three-year Programs of Fiscal Adjustments between the National Treasury and the 25 
states adjusted the primary balances and indebtedness targets and broadened the fiscal 
space for new borrowing. Through its development bank, the federal government created 
a credit line for SNGs that had suffered loss of federal transfers. Given that some states 
were not in compliance with the requirements  of fiscal  responsibility legislation, this 
operation is considered to be exceptional and allows all states to access the line of credit.  
In India, the central government allowed the states to raise additional market borrowings, 
thus increasing the limit of gross fiscal deficit to 3.5 percent of gross state domestic 
product  in  fiscal  2008/09,  and  to  4.0  percent  in  fiscal  2009/10,  exceeding  the  FRL 
targets.
26  The challenge will be to manage the exit  from fiscal stimulus and to resume a 
commitment to fiscal sustainability.   
Some FRLs were enacted more to guide a fiscal adjustment process than to set a 
framework for fiscal policy for long -term.  The global financial crisis of 2008 -2009 
brought  to  the  fore  the  issues  of  fiscal  policy  over  the  economi c  cycles  and  the 
coordination of counter-cyclical fiscal policies across the different institutions of the 
government.  It is not clear, however, the extent to which FRLs are suited to serve as the 
main legal basis for long -term fiscal management or are on ly one part of the overall 
institutional framework for long-term fiscal prudence.    
C.  Subnational FRL in the context of national reform 
Macroeconomic  developments  and  nationwide  reforms  can  provide  an  overall 
impetus.  Consistency  with  other  parts  of  the  macro-fiscal  system,  subnational  fiscal 
reform often unfolds in the broader macroeconomic context. In Canada, macroeconomic 
deterioration in the 1980s to early 1990s led to major changes in monetary and fiscal 
policy.  After suffering from a lack of credibility, the Bank of Canada since the early 
1990s  committed  to  low  and  stable  inflation.  The  attainment  of  inflation  targeting 
overtime  improved  market  and  public  confidence  (Perrier  and  Armano  2000;  Paulin 
2000; OECD 2001). On the fiscal front, in the early 1990s, the importance of restoring 
sound public finances became increasingly clear at both the federal and provincial level.  
The fiscal framework adopted by the federal government and legislation by provinces 
were part of the move toward more sustainable public finances (Traclet 2004).  
Establishing an FRL or other institution to constrain SNG debt and deficits works 
only if the governments in question start from or are brought to a position where they do 
not have extreme debt overhang.  In other words, if the service on existing debt is already 
too large to pay realistically in the political economic situation, this attenuates greatly the 
incentive from an FRL to behave with fiscal responsibility.  Consequently, a set of SNG 
fiscal adjustment and debt rescheduling programs often must complement or precede the 
implementation of an FRL.  To work, the programs must strike a balance between being 
sufficient to eliminate the debt overhang and being so generous as to seem to reward 
fiscal  irresponsibility  of  the  past  (or  to  fiscally  hamstring  the  national  government).  
                                                 




Brazil,  Colombia,  and  India  undertook  SNG  debt  restructuring  ,  separate  from  or 
preceding the FRL.   
The  dynamics  of  subnational-central  government  interaction  provides  political 
momentum  and  stimulates  discussion  of  fiscal  reforms.  Given  the  growing  share  of 
subnational  finance  in  the  consolidated  public  finance  and  the  growing  influence  of 
political  forces  at  the subnational  level,  often a subnational  government  can lead the 
fiscal  reform  which serves  as  demonstration effect  on the national  reform.   In  India, 
following  the  state  fiscal  crisis  in  the  late  1990s  to  the  early  2000s,  the  states  of 
Karnataka and Punjab each enacted its own fiscal responsibility law in 2002, first in the 
country. The federal FRL followed in 2003, and other states soon after from 2003-2007.  
In  Australia,  some  states  went  ahead  with  fiscal  reforms  and  enacted  legislation 
committing to balanced budget or debt targets, prior to the federal enactment of Charter 
of Budget Honesty in 1998.   
A national government can pass the FRL for itself and encourage SNGs to pass 
their  own  FRLs.    In  India,  following  the  recommendation  of  the  Twelfth  Finance 
Commission in 2004, debt relief to a state offered by the Debt Consolidation and Relief 
Facility was based on a condition for the state to enact the FRL.  The FRL should, at the 
minimum, provide for elimination of revenue deficit
27 by 2008/09 and reduction of fiscal 
deficit to 3 per cent of GSDP. 21 states put in place FRL beginning 2005/06.  Five states 
already had enacted FRLs even before this condition was imposed by the Twelfth 
Finance Commission.
28  The framework intended to promote growth-expansionary fiscal 
consolidation by providing fiscal incentives for SNGs to eliminate their revenue deficits, 
thereby ensuring that net public borrowing is directed exclusively towards growth -
enhancing public investment (India Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2009).   
Since  fiscal  responsibility  with  multiple  players  (national  and  subnational 
governments) is a coordina tion problem with multiple possible equilibria (Braun and 
Tommasi 2004), it depends on having a critical mass of states that voluntarily obey the 
rules and politically support the national government when it applies sanctions to enforce 
the rules.  Thus the fiscal sanction of Minas Gerais in 2000 assured that no other states 
would challenge the law and thus was a critical step in the success of Brazil’s FRL.  
VII.  Conclusions 
Given the difficulties of determining causality of FRLs and fiscal outcomes, it 
will be  difficult  to say  whether FRLs  are necessary or sufficient for achieving fiscal 
prudence at multiple levels of government.  Country examples reviewed in this paper 
show that FRLs can help coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence, but they 
are not a substitute for commitment and should not be viewed as ends in themselves. 
FRLs can make a positive contribution by adding to the collection of other measures to 
                                                 
27 In India, revenue deficit is current expenditure net of all revenues.  
28The Debt Consolidation and The Debt Consolidation and Relief Facility (DCRF) comprised consolidation 
of central loans contracted till March 2004 and outstanding on 31 March 2005, along with debt write -offs, 
linked to reduction of the revenue deficits of states and containment of fiscal deficit at the 2004 -05 level. 
The  five  states  are:  Karnataka,  Kerala,  Tamil  Nadu,  Punjab  and  Uttar  Pradesh.  Thirteenth  Finance 




shore up a coalition of states with the central government in support of fiscal prudence. 
Although  political  consensus  for  fiscal  prudence  is  clearly  a  necessary  condition  to 
launch  a  successful  FRL,  the  test  of  its  effective  implementation  comes  when  the 
consensus  breaks  down,  and  then  one  sees  whether  the  institution  works  to  help  the 
remaining stabilization champions restrain the fiscal excesses that the populists might 
want.   
In designing an FRL, defining fiscal targets poses a special challenge.  Many 
factors that influence the fiscal accounts of the SNGs are exogenous to the SNGs, such as 
interest and exchange rates.  The national governments also mandate expenditure items 
and  the  intergovernmental  fiscal  frameworks  may  limit  the  taxation  power  of  SNGs. 
Focusing on ratios where the SNGs have control over the denominator as well as the 
numerator (e.g., wage bill as a share of total spending) is more likely to have the desired 
effect than relying on ratios that are substantially influenced by exogenous factors.  
An important lesson is that a set of SNG fiscal adjustment and debt rescheduling 
programs often must complement or precede the implementation of an FRL. It is not 
realistic  to  expect  SNGs  with  large  debt  overhang  to  comply  with  sustainable  fiscal 
targets.  On the other hand, in order for FRLs to provide credible incentives for fiscal 
prudence, the terms of restructuring cannot signal potential future bailouts.  Therefore, 
there  needs  to  be  a  balance  between  avoiding  moral  hazard  and  proving  sufficient 
financial relief to ensure that the SNGs can realistically comply with FRLs.  
Even  when  FRLs  are  effective,  they  cannot  do  the  job  alone.    The  potential 
contribution depends on how well it complements the rest of the institutional framework 
for  SNG  fiscal  restraint—making  labor  and  pension  laws  more  flexible,  giving 
subnational governments more taxing power, using rules for debt renegotiations to reduce 
the salary bill as a share of revenue, using financial sector regulation to restrain lending to 
SNGs, and commitment to hard budget constraints on SNGs. The experience shows the 
need  to  have  both  ex  ante  constraints  on  borrowing  and  ex  post  sanctions  for  over 
borrowing.  Even beyond the network of specific fiscal rules, the deeper institutions and 
expectations need to motivate respect and enforcement of the rules, otherwise they do 
little good (Braun and Tomassi 2004). 
Future  research  might  want  to  pursue  the  following  questions:  How  to  set 
subnational  along  with  national  fiscal  targets,  either  in  FRLs  or  other  public  finance 
laws? How these targets relate to the threshold for fiscal and debt sustainability?  How to 
construct  escape  clauses  that  will  not  become  convenient  evasion  clauses  in  case  of 
severe  global  or  regional  downturns?  What  kind  of  enforcement  mechanism  would 
ensure fiscal discipline, particularly in the absence of effective market systems?  Over the 
longer periods of business and political cycles, can the effect of fiscal legislation be more 
accurately  measured?  How  can  one  design  institutions  for  fiscal  discipline—FRLs, 





Annex 1:  Fiscal Responsibility Laws 
Table A1.1: Argentina 
Political Units  Date 
Procedural Rules and 
Transparency 
Requirements 
   Numerical Targets     Escape 
Clauses     Sanctions   
National FRL--"Fiscal 
Solvency Law"-- only 
for national 
government; intended 
as model for provinces 
1999  Multiannual budgets; prohibition 
of extra budgetary funds; 
penalties for spending units if they 
spend over budget 
   Deficit limits in 1999-2002; 
balance budget thereafter;  
primary spending growth rate no 
higher than real GDP growth 
rate;   
   None; Law called 
for stabilization 
fund, with inflow 
from sale of SOEs 
and 1-2 percent of 
tax revenues 
   Penalties for 
national 
spending units 
if they spend 
over budget 
 
National -- "Zero 
Deficit Law" 
2001      Zero deficit by 2002           
National "FRL" --
applying to provincial 
as well as national 
governments. 21/24 
provinces and City of 
Buenos Aires agreed 
to comply. 
2004  3-year multiannual budgets; Debt 
management needs to ensure 
(move toward) debt service less 
than 15 % of net revenue; new 
borrowing or guarantees need Min 
of Econ approval; no non-peso 
domestic bonds from SNGs; 
SNGs publish fiscal accounts and 
all debt related transactions in a 
standard format.   
Established a Federal Council for 
Fiscal Responsibility, with 
membership from the national and 
all provincial ministries of 
finance. 
   Nominal growth rate of primary 
spending by each government must 
be lower than projected national 
GDP growth; for SNG governments 
with debt less than 15% of current 
revenue the restriction applies only 
to current spending. The national 
government budget must have an 
overall primary fiscal balance after, 
excluding five categories of 
spending (spending with loans from 
International Financial Institutions, 
capital spending for social 
infrastructure, subnational spending 
financed by non-automatic transfers, 
extra spending due to Education 
Financial Law, and payments on 
court rulings).  SNGs have to budget 
primary surpluses adequate to bring 
their debt service gradually below 15 
percent of current revenues (net of 
transfers to municipalities) and may 
not do new borrowing if their debt 
service is over the ceiling.  
   National and 
provincial 
governments must 
put money into 
stabilization funds.  
In 2004-05, 
Mendoza and Santa 
Fe started funds, but 
no data available on 
performance.  In 
2009, key fiscal 
targets in the law 
were suspended by 
Congress for 2009 
and 2010... 
       
    Source: Government legislation. (Ley 25.152; Ley 25.453; Ley 25.917) 




Table A1.2: Australia (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements  Numerical Targets  Escape 







Public Finance and Audit Act 1983: 
• The treasurer is charged to publicly release monthly statement 
and half year review setting out projections and year-to-date 
budget balances. The Budget Papers for a budget year are to be 
tabled in the Legislative Assembly before the end of the prior 
financial year.  
• No later than 31 October after concluding a fiscal year, the 
Treasurer is to present the consolidated financial statements and 
general government sector financial statements as audited by the 
Auditor-General, and the opinions of the Auditor-General on 
those statements, to the Legislative Assembly.    
General Government Debt Elimination Act 1995 (repealed 
in 2005): 
• Within 3 months of the enactment of this act, the Treasurer is 
to table in Parliament a comprehensive financial management 
framework. 
• The progress reports of budget papers should include: 
Measures taken to fund employer superannuation liabilities, to 
maintain assets of the state and prudently manage the risks; The 
projected growth in net cost of services and expenses for a 
budget year and each year of the forward estimates period; 
impact of proposed tax policy changes. 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 2005: 
• The act lays out the fiscal principles and targets for the state. In 
application of fiscal principles, the government should report in 
annual budget papers: 
• an assessment of past and prospective long-term average 
revenue growth 
• an assessment of the impact of budget measures in respect of 
expenses and revenue on long-term fiscal gaps 
• measures taken to reflect the fiscal principles. These measures 
include: measures taken to maintain or increase general 
government worth; measures taken to fund employer 
superannuation liabilities; measures taken to align physical asset 
management of government agencies with their service delivery 
priorities and strategies; measures taken to manage risks 
prudently. 
• The estimated impact of proposed tax policy changes 
 
General Government Debt Elimination Act 
1995 (repealed in 2005): 
• To achieve a sustainable surplus budget for 
the general government sector within 3 years 
after enactment of the Act 
• To reduce, by 30 June 2005, the level of 
public net debt to a sustainable level, which are 
defined as a level at which the budget can 
absorb the economic cyclical impact without 
need for significant corrective action on the 
revenue and expenditure side 
• To eliminate net debt of federal government 
sector by 30 June 2020 and eliminate the 
unfunded superannuation liabilities by 30 June 
2030. 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 2005:  
In the medium term:  
• reduce the level of general government net 
financial liabilities to <= 7.5% of gross state 
product by 30 June 2010 
• maintain the level of general government net 
debt <= 0.8%   of gross state product (the level 
at 30 June 2005), unless an increase is required 
in net debt to reduce one or more components 
of general government net financial liabilities. 
In the long term: 
• reduce the level of general government net 
financial liabilities to <= 6% of gross state 
product by 30 June 2015 
• maintain the level of general government net 
debt <= 0.8% of gross state product (the level at 
30 June 2005), unless an increase is required in 
net debt to reduce one or more components of 
general government net financial liabilities. 
• eliminate the total state sector unfunded 
superannuation liabilities by 30 June 2030 
 
N/A  • Reputational 
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Financial Management Act 1995: 
• The Treasurer is to publish quarterly financial statements in the 
Gazette and audited annual reports which include the original 
estimates of budget, results in respect of the major Government 
Finance Statistics statements as reported by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, and explanation of significant deviations. 
The audited annual reports should be tabled in the Legislative 
Assembly. 
Fiscal Integrity and Transparency Act 2001: 
• The Treasurer must publicly release and table the first and each 
subsequent fiscal strategy statements for a particular 
Government at or before the specific time. Changes can be made 
by public release of a new fiscal strategy statement. Such a 
statement should: 
(a) specify medium-term fiscal objectives;  
(b) explain the broad strategic priorities on which the budget is 
or will be based;   
(c) specify the key fiscal indicators against which fiscal policy 
will be set and assessed;  
(d) specify, for the budget year and the following 3 financial 
years: (i) the Government’s fiscal objectives and targets; and (ii) 
the expected outcomes for the specified key fiscal indicators; and 
(e) explain how the fiscal objectives and strategic priorities relate 
to the principles of sound fiscal management. 
• The Treasurer must publicly release and table a fiscal outlook 
report at the time of each budget, mid-year outlook report and 
fiscal results report. The contents of these reports are specified in 
the Act.  
• The Under Treasurer must publicly release a pre-election fiscal 
outlook report within 10 days after the issue of the writ for an 
election. 
Fiscal Integrity and Transparency Act 2001: 
No specific numerical rules and targets. The 
principles of sound financial management are: 
• To formulate and apply spending and taxing 
policies with consideration of the effect on 
employment, the economic prosperity and 
development of the Territory and giving rise to a 
reasonable degree of stability and predictability;  
• To ensure that funding for current services is to 
be provided by the current generation;  
• To manage financial risks faced by the Territory 
prudently (having regard to economic 
circumstances), and maintain Territory debt at 
prudent levels. 
 
N/A  • 
Reputational 
 




Table A1.2: Australia (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements  Numerical Targets  Escape 
Clauses  Sanctions 
Queensland  1999 
2009 
The 1999 amendment of Financial Administration and Audit 
Act (repealed in 2009): 
• The Treasurer should prepare a charter of social and fiscal 
responsibility for the State and table it in the Legislative Assembly. 
The charter is to state the broad social and fiscal objectives of the 
Government and establish a framework for assessing the 
Government’s performance in achieving the objectives. 
• The charter must be based on the principles of:  
(a) Transparency and accountability in developing, implementing 
and reporting on the Government’s social and fiscal objectives;  
(b) Efficient and effective allocation and use of resources;  
(c) Equity relating to the raising of revenue, delivery of government 
services, and between present and future generations; 
(d) Prudent management of risk. 
Financial Accountability Act 2009: 
• The act lays out principles, rules and procedures for fiscal 
management. The government should publish regular, informative 
reports on the outcomes of the activities, against previously 
announced objectives and release annual report on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its activities in meeting the Government’s objectives 
for the community.  Specifically: 
(a) The premier must present to the Legislative Assembly on 
government’s community objectives as well as fiscal objectives and 
outcomes regularly;  
(b) The Premier must table each half year report and full year report 
of ministerial offices expenses in the Legislative Assembly within 
specific timelines. Full year report should be audited by auditor-
general. 
•  The Act requires from time to time, the Treasurer prepare and 
table in the Legislative Assembly a charter of fiscal responsibility 
giving details of the government’s fiscal objectives and fiscal 
principles that support those fiscal objectives. The treasurer must 
report regularly to the Legislative Assembly on the outcomes the 
government has achieved against the objectives stated in the charter.  
 
Charter of Fiscal Responsibility 2009: 
The fiscal principles are set out broadly to 
maintain fiscal sustainability and a competitive 
tax regime, and manage the State’s balance sheet. 
The principles are: 
• In the General Government sector, meet all 
operating expenses from operating revenue  
• Growth in own-purpose expenses in the General 
Government sector to not exceed real per capital 
growth. 
• Achieve a General Government net operating 
surplus as soon as possible, but no later than 
2015-16 
• Maintain a competitive tax environment for 
business 
• Stabilize net financial liabilities as a proportion 
of revenue in the Non-financial Public Sector 
• Target full funding of long-term liabilities such 
as superannuation in accordance with actuarial 
advice 
 
N/A  • Reputational 
 




Table A1.2: Australia (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and Transparency Requirements  Numerical Targets  Escape 
Clauses  Sanctions 
Tasmania  1990 
2007 
Financial Management and Audit Act 1990: 
• The Treasurer is to publish in the Gazette a report, the half-yearly report, and 
an audited annual report which include the original estimates of budget, results 
in respect of the major Government Finance Statistics statements as reported by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and explanation of significant deviations. 
The annual report should be laid before each House of Parliament and copies 
should be available to the public.  
Charter of Budget Responsibility Act 2007: 
• The Treasurer is to publicly announce and table the first fiscal strategy 
statement for a particular Government at or before the time of the Government's 
first budget. It may be changed at any time by announcing and tabling a new 
fiscal strategy statement. Such strategy should establish a benchmark for 
evaluating the Government's fiscal performance by specifying: 
(1) the long-term objectives within which budgets will be framed,  
(2) the key fiscal measures against which fiscal policy will be set and assessed,  
(3) the fiscal objectives and targets for the budget year and the following 3 
financial years,  
(4) How the fiscal objectives and strategic priorities relate to the principles of 
sound fiscal management.  
• The Leader of an Opposition party is to publicly announce a fiscal strategy 
statement, and provide a copy of the statement to the Secretary, within 15 days 
of the issue of a writ for an election for the House of Assembly. 
• Pre-election financial outlook report should be prepared.  
Charter of Budget Responsibility Act 2007: 
• No specific numerical rules and targets. The 
principles of sound financial management are 
to 
(a) ensure transparency and accountability in 
developing, implementing and reporting on 
fiscal objectives; and 
(b) ensure the efficient and effective 
allocation and sustainable use of resources in 
achieving objectives; and 
(c) ensure that policy decisions have regard to 
their financial effects on future generations; 
and 
(d) formulate spending and taxation policies 
that ensure a reasonable degree of equity, 
stability and predictability; and 
(e) manage financial risks prudently 
 
N/A  • Reputational 
Victoria  2000  Financial Management Act 1994, amended in 2000: 
• The act establishes a budgeting and reporting framework for sound public 
financial management. It specifies the purposes and contents of each government 
documents including the financial policy objectives and strategies statements, 
quarterly financial reports, mid-year reports, audited annual financial reports and 
budget update and requires the documents to be transmitted to or laid before 
each house of the Parliament on or before pre-specified date. The financial 
policy objectives statement should specify the financial objectives and targets of 
current year as well as those of three following years.    
 
Financial Management Act 1994, amended 
in 2000: 
• No specific numerical rules and targets. The 
principles are laid out to ensure sound 
financial management including prudent 
management of financial risks faced by the 
State, having regard to economic 
circumstances; pursuing spending and taxing 
policies that can maintain a reasonable degree 
of stability and predictability in the tax 
burden level; maintaining the integrity of the 
Victorian tax system; taking into account the 
impact of policy decisions on future 
generations; and providing full, accurate and 
timely disclosure of financial information 
relating to the Government and its agencies. 





Table A1.2: Australia (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements  Numerical Targets  Escape 




2000  Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000: 
The act sets out a framework for public financial planning 
incorporating a set of principles and rules. 
• The Treasurer must release a Government Financial Strategy 
Statement at least once in each calendar year which sets out 
government's medium term fiscal strategy. Any significant 
change to fiscal strategies should be released as soon as possible; 
• The Treasurer should release a Government Financial 
Projections Statement which includes projection for the budget 
year and next 3 years when the appropriation Bills and budget 
papers for a budget or supplementary budget are tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly; 
• The Treasurer must release a Government Mid-year Financial 
Projections Statement and an audited annual report on state 
finance within prescribed date; 
•  The Under Treasurer should release a Pre-election Financial 
Projections Statement within 10 days after the Legislative 
Assembly is dissolved or expires; 
•  The Treasurer should release a Quarterly Financial Results 
Report for each quarter. 
 
Government Financial Responsibility Act 
2000: 
• There are no specific numerical rules and 
targets. However the financial management 
principles require current services to be funded 
by the current generation; spending and taxing 
policies to be formulated and applied so as to 
give rise to a reasonable degree of stability and 
predictability; financial risks to be managed 
prudently; spending and taxing policies are to be 
formulated and applied with consideration to the 
effects of these policies on employment and the 
economic prosperity of the State. 
 






Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997: 
• Finance Minister must publish monthly financial statements. 
Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998: 
• Annual reports must be audited by Auditor - General. The 
government strategy should reflect sound financial management 
principles. The government should release and present to the 
parliament the following reports regularly based on prescribed 
timelines: the government's fiscal strategy statement, budget and 
mid-year economic and fiscal outlook reports, final fiscal 
outcomes reports and intergenerational reports. A pre-election 
fiscal and economic outlook report should be released if a 
general election is called, as well as policy costing upon request. 
 
Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998: 
No specific numerical rules and targets. The 
principles of sound financial management are 
set out: 
• prudent management of financial risks of the 
government by maintaining general government 
debt at prudent levels;  
• to ensure that fiscal policies are to achieve 
adequate national saving and to moderate 
cyclical fluctuations in economic activity;  
• consistent spending and taxing policies to 
ensure stability and predictability;  
• the integrity of the tax system;  
• Policy decisions to have regard to their 
financial effects on future generations.  
N/A  • Reputational 
Source: Various fiscal responsibility laws from websites of Australian state legislatures. 




Table A1.3: Brazil 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and 
Transparency Requirements     Numerical Targets     Escape Clause     Sanction 
                  National 
FRL applies 
to all tiers of 
government 
2000  • The law sets minimum standards for state 
budgeting, personnel management, and debt 
management.  
• The annual budget of each SNG has to be 
consistent with its multiyear budget plan and 
with the federal fiscal and monetary program. 
•The law explicitly prohibits debt refinancing 
operations between different levels of 
government.  
Strengthened transparency rules for all levels of 
government: 
• Proposals, laws and accounts must be widely 
distributed, including through electronic media; 
• Forecasts, objectives as well as targets and 
results need to be periodically published; 
• The Executive Branch of each Municipal 
Government must consolidate its accounts and 
send to the central government. The central 
government complies the accounts for entire 
federation; 
• A bi-monthly budget execution report should 
be published, containing budgetary balance 
sheet as well as summary of expenditures and 
revenues; 
• The heads of government branches must issue 
a Fiscal Management Report every 4 months 
and make it widely available to the public 
 
  Article 12: The estimated revenue 
for credit operation must not 
exceed the capital expenditures in 
the Annual Draft Budget law. 
Article 19:  For states and 
municipalities, Wage and salary 
cost may not exceed 60 percent of 
current revenue. 
Article 20: with the following 
minimums for each branch of 
government: 
• State: 3 percent Legislative, 6 
percent Judiciary, 49 percent 
executive, 1 percent state 
prosecutor. 
• Municipal: 6 percent legislative, 
54 percent executive 
Article 23:  If personnel 
expenditures exceed these limits, 
the excess percentages must be 
reduced within the next two 4-
month periods, with at least one-
third of the reduction coming in 
the first 4-month period. 
Article 30:  Requires the Federal 
Senate to set overall limits for 
federal and subnational debt. 
 
  • Public calamities 
acknowledged by 
both houses of 
national Congress, 
including state of 
defense, siege and a 
low growth rate, 
defined as less than 1 
percent in last four 
quarters  
  • If total personnel 
expenditures exceed 
95% of the ceiling, new 
hiring, wage increases 
and contracting overtime 
work are suspended; 
• Officials who violate 
the rules will be subject 
to criminal penalties, 
fines and perhaps even 
jail, according to the law 
of Fiscal Crimes. 
• If the debt targets are 
not achieved, SNGs will 
be prohibited from: 
receiving voluntary 
transfers, obtaining 
guarantees from Federal 
government or other 
states and contracting 
credit operations unless 
used as refinancing 
securities debt and 
reducing personnel 
expenditures. 
Source: Government website. 





Table A1.4: Canada 
Political 
Units  Date 
Procedural Rules and 
Transparency 
Requirements 
   Numerical Targets     Escape Clauses     Sanctions 
Alberta  1993 
1995 
1999 
Government Accountability Act 
1995: 
• The Minister of Finance should 
have consolidated fiscal plans, annual 
reports and ministry reports laid 
before the Legislature and available 
to general public within prescribed 
deadlines. The consolidated fiscal 
plan including the government 
business plan and capital plan among 
others should be for the fiscal year 
and the subsequent 2 fiscal years.  
The Minister of Finance must report 
publicly to the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council on the accuracy of the 
consolidated fiscal plan with respect 
to the first 3, 6, and 9 months of each 
fiscal year within prescribed dates. 
The contents of each report are 
specified. 
  Deficit Elimination Act 1993 (repealed 
in1995): 
• To achieve a deficit target of $2.5 billion in 
1993-94 and a balanced budget in 1996-97.  
Balanced Budget and Debt Retirement Act 
1995 (repealed in1999): 
• Annual balanced budgets and conservative 
revenue forecasts are required 
• Establishing a schedule to repay net debt by 
the end of 2012-22, or a 25 years limit 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1999: 
• Deficits and opening debt are not allowed;  
• Actual expenses for a fiscal year must not be 
more than actual revenue for that year; 
• The Capital Account is established as an 
account within the General Revenue Fund, net 
assets of this account may not be reduced to an 
amount less than zero; 
• The consolidated fiscal plan must include a 
contingency allowance for each fiscal year set 
out in the plan equal to at least 1% of revenue 
for fiscal policy purposes. 
  Fiscal Responsibility 
Act 1999: 
• Alberta 
Sustainability Fund is 
established from 
which fund could be 
transferred to achieve 
balanced budget in 











The Budget Transparency and 
Accountability Act 2000: 
• Regular disclosure of fiscal 
information by finance minister;  
• The minister must make public a 
budget consultation paper and present 
the main estimates for a fiscal year to 
the Legislative Assembly with the 
budget for that fiscal year as well as 
economic and fiscal forecasts and 
major capital investment information 
each year;  
• Make public any significant change 
to the estimates as soon as 
practicable, the public accounts for 
the previous fiscal year and quarterly 
report on or before prescribed date. 
  Taxpayer Protection Act 1991 (repealed in 
1992): 
• A five-year balanced budget plan was created; 
a tax freeze and prevention of new taxes; 
limitations on expenditure growth; a Debt 
Reduction Plan and an annual progress report. 
Balanced Budget Act 2000 (repealed in 
2001): 
• Setting up progressively lower deficit targets 
between 2000-01 to 2003-04 and requiring 
balanced budget beginning in 2004-05; 
Balanced Budget and Ministerial 
Accountability Act 2001: 
• The main estimates must not contain a 
forecast of deficit for a fiscal year, but it does 
not apply to 2009-10 and 2010-11 fiscal year. 
 
  Balanced Budget 
Act 2000 (repealed 
in 2001): 
• The maximum 











• 2009-2010 and 
2010-11 fiscal year 
  Balanced Budget Act 2000 
(repealed in 2001): 
• The members of the Executive 
Council were subject to a 20% 
pay cut when targets are not 
met; The reduction could be 
partially or fully restored when 
certain targets are met. 
Balanced Budget and 
Ministerial Accountability Act 
2001: 
• 20% of salary of each 
Executive Council member is 
held back. The reduction can be 
partially or fully restored when 
collective and/or individual 
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Political 
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Fiscal Stabilization Fund Act 1989: 
• To establish a fiscal stabilization 
fund with the purpose of stabilizing 
the fiscal position from year to year 
and improving long-term fiscal 
planning. 
Balanced Budget, Debt Repayment 
and Taxpayer Accountability Act 
1995: 
• Major tax rate increases will be 
decided by Province-wide 
referendum. 
• A debt repayment plan is set up for 
general-purpose debt and unfunded 
pension liabilities. 
• Public hearings must be held before 
the Act can be amended or repealed 
and the Act prevents changes in 
accounting policy to meet balanced 
budget targets. 
The Balanced Budget, Fiscal 
Management and Taxpayer 
Accountability Act 2008: 
• At the time of tabling the budget, the 
minister must table in the Legislative 
Assembly a statement of the 
government's financial management 
strategy describing the government's 
objectives for measurable outcomes 
and containing a summary of core 
expenditure and revenue estimates.   
• After each fiscal year, the minister 
should table in the Legislative 
Assembly a report comparing the 
results to the financial management 
strategy laid before the fiscal year, 
while tabling the public accounts. 
 
  Balanced Budget, Debt 
Repayment and Taxpayer 
Accountability Act 1995: 
• Balanced budgets are required 
from 1995-96 and onward; 
The Balanced Budget, Fiscal 
Management and Taxpayer 
Accountability Act 2008: 
• For each fiscal year, the budget for 
the government reporting entity laid 
before the Legislative Assembly 
must project a positive balance as at 
the end of that year. The balance as 
at the end of a fiscal year is 
determined as the average of the net 
results for the fiscal years within the 
four-year period ending at that time.  
 
  Balanced Budget, Debt 
Repayment and Taxpayer 
Accountability Act 1995: 
• Deficits are permitted in the 
face of a natural disaster, war, 
or revenue reduction of 5 
percent or more that is not 
due to a change in tax laws. 
The Balanced Budget, 
Fiscal Management and 
Taxpayer Accountability 
Act 2008: 
• The net income or loss for a 
fiscal year may be adjusted by 
excluding a revenue shortfall 
or increase in expenses for the 
fiscal year that occurred 
because of 
 (a) an unanticipated natural 
or other disaster; 
 (b) Canada being at war or 
under the apprehension of 
war; 
 (c) unusual weather or 
climate conditions not 
anticipated in the budget; or 
 (d) a decision of another 
level of government or of a 
regulatory body that took 
effect after the budget for the 
fiscal year was tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly or 
within 30 days before it was 
tabled, the fiscal impact of 
which was not anticipated in 
the budget. 
 




• If a deficit occurs, it must 
be offset in the next fiscal 
year; in this case, penalties 
will be imposed in second 
year. Ministerial salaries 
are cut by 20 % in the first 
year of a deficit and by 40 
per cent in the second year.  
The Balanced Budget, 
Fiscal Management and 
Taxpayer Accountability 
Act 2008: 
• If the balance as at the 
end of a fiscal year is 
negative, Ministerial 
salaries are cut by 20 % in 
the first year of a deficit 
and by 40 per cent in the 
second year. 
• If after the general 
election the party forming 
the government changes, 
the reduction would not 
apply to the new minister 
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Fiscal Stabilization Fund Act 2001: 
• A fiscal stabilization fund was created with the purpose of stabilizing 
the fiscal position and improving long-term fiscal planning. 
Taxpayer Protection Act 2003: 
• Referendum approval is required for new taxes or increases of tax 
rates for certain taxes. 
Fiscal Responsibility and Balanced Budget Act 2006: 
• The Minister must lay before the Legislative Assembly the main 
estimates and capital estimates for the next fiscal year in each year. 
And each year the Minister shall provide details as to how the public 
may participate in pre-budget consultations and shall make public a 
pre-budget consultation document that sets out the key fiscal issues for 
consideration by the public.  
 
  Balanced Budget Act 1993: 
• It is required that the cumulative ordinary 
balance for the three-year period up to 
1995-96 and cumulative budgets for four-
year periods thereafter be in balance. 
Fiscal Responsibility and Balanced 
Budget Act 2006: 
• Balanced budget: the total amount of the 
expenses should not exceed the total 
amount of revenue for each fiscal year. 
• Reduction in net debt ratio: the ratio of 
net debt to GDP at the end of each year 
should be less than at the end of the 
previous fiscal period. 
 
  N/A    • Reputational 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
2004  Transparency and Accountability Act 2004: 
• All government entities are categorized as either category 1, 2 or 3 
government entities and are required to prepare strategic plans, 
business plans or activity plans respectively. These plans will set out 
goals and objectives of the government entity and objective 
performance measures for the period covered by the plan. The plans 
should also include a statement that the responsible minister or the 
governing body is accountable for the preparation of the plan. 
• A government entity shall each year prepare an annual report for the 
preceding fiscal year. The annual report of category 1 or 2 government 
entities shall compare the actual results with the projected results of its 
strategic plan or business plan and provide an explanation of any 
variance. The report of category 3 government entity shall represent 
information on the activities of the entity carried out during the 
preceding fiscal year. Annual report shall include a statement that the 
responsible minister or chairperson is accountable for the actual results 
reported. 
• The minister of Finance shall publish a 3 year fiscal forecast and 
shall, semi-annually, report on the economic and fiscal position of the 
province. 
• The Minister of Finance shall publish a 3 year forecast respecting the 
impact of government policies and economic development on the fiscal 
performance of the government and the performance of the province’s 
economy. 
• When the requirement of reports and plans set out by the Act is not 
meet, the responsible minister shall make public a written statement 
giving reasons for the non-compliance. 
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Financial Measures Act 1996, 
amended in 2000: 
• The government should release four-
year fiscal projections with major 
economic assumptions and their 
impact on government finances. 
• Until the proportion of public debt 
denominated in foreign currencies is 
equal to or less than 20 percent of 
total public debt, financial 
transactions that increase foreign 
currency exposure are prohibited and 
refinancing of foreign currency debt 
must eliminate the foreign currency 
exposure  
• New programs and services should 
be financed through existing budgets. 
Provincial Finance Act 1989, 
amended in 2000: 
• The minister should table a 
consolidated fiscal plan while tabling 
the estimates for a fiscal year in the 
House of Assembly. A consolidated 
fiscal plan shall include fiscal 
projections for the four-year period 
and underlying economic assumptions 
and a summary of government 
business plan for the fiscal year. The 
annual report on outcomes against 
business plan for the fiscal year 
should be submitted to the House of 
Assembly within prescribed date.  
 
  Expenditure Control Act 1993: 
• Reducing net operating expenditures by 
10 per cent and net capital expenditures by 
20 percent from 1994-95 to 1997-98. 
Expenditure Control Act 1993, 
amended in 1996: 
• Requiring annual balanced budgets 
starting in 1996-97, with surpluses aimed 
at reducing the public debt and/or taxes; 
• Overspending in a fiscal year should not 
be more than 1 percent of the appropriated 
expenditures from the House. 
Financial Measures Act 1996, amended 
in 2000: 
• Balanced budgets are required by 2002-
03 
Provincial Finance Act 1989, amended 
in 2000: 
• Commencing 2002-03 fiscal year, no 
budget deficit can be proposed. When 
deficit occurs, it should be recovered by 
the end of next fiscal year. 
 
  Financial Measures Act 1996, 
amended in 2000: 
• Deficits must be recovered in 
the next fiscal year, unless a 
deficit results from a natural or 
other disaster; losses associated 
with a sale, dissolution, closure 
or other restructuring of a 
government service 
organizations; or expenditure 
incurred by an unforeseen 
increase in debt service costs. 
Provincial Finance Act 1989, 
amended in 2000: 
• The deficit is not required to be 
recovered if it is the result of a 
natural or other disaster, losses 
associated with a sale, 
dissolution, closure or other 
restructuring of a governmental 
unit or government business 
enterprise that are not anticipated 
to have financial impact on future 
fiscal years or an expense 
incurred with respect to debt 
servicing costs that exceeds the 
amount budgeted for the fiscal 
year. 
 
  • Reputational 




Table A1.4: Canada (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date 
Procedural Rules and 
Transparency 
Requirements 
   Numerical Targets     Escape Clauses     Sanctions 
Ontario  1999 
2004 
Taxpayer Protection Act 1999: 
• Requirement of voter's approval 
for tax increases 
Fiscal Transparency and 
Accountability Act 2004: 
• The Budget Paper should be laid 
before the Legislation Assembly 
each year which addresses the fiscal 
plan for the fiscal year budgeted and 
the following two fiscal years.  
• Among others, the minster is 
responsible to have the following 
reports released within prescribed 
dates: mid-year review of fiscal 
plan, updated information about 
revenues and expenses, long-range 
assessment of fiscal environment 
two years after provincial election, 
and pre-election reports under 
certain regulation. 
 
  Taxpayer Protection Act 1999: 
• Requirement of balanced budgets 
beginning with the 2001-02 fiscal year. 
• Expenditures must not exceed revenues in 
a given fiscal year plus the net accumulated 
surplus from the previous three fiscal years 
Fiscal Transparency and Accountability 
Act 2004: 
• Maintain a prudent ratio of provincial debt 
to gross domestic product;  
• For each fiscal year, the Executive 
Council should plan a balanced budget 
except extraordinary circumstances. If a 
deficit is planned, the Executive Council 
should also develop a recovery plan for 
achieving a balanced budget in the future. 
The recovery plan should specify the period 
within which a balanced budget will be 
achieved. 
 
  Taxpayer Protection Act 1999: 
• Deficits are only permitted in very limited 
circumstances: such as a natural or other 
disasters, war or apprehension of war, or a 
revenue decline of at least 5 per cent for a 
reason other than a tax rate reduction. 
• A deficit of less than 1 per cent of revenue 
is permitted, but must be offset in the 
following year. 
• Voter approval is not required if the new or 
increased tax is 1) not designed to increase 
revenues, 2) a response to a change in federal 
tax laws or a restructuring of 
intergovernmental tax authority, or 3) 
required as a result of a reorganization or 
restructuring of a Crown agency. 
Fiscal Transparency and Accountability 
Act 2004: 
Extraordinary circumstances which are not 
specified 
 
  Taxpayer Protection 
Act 1999: 
• If a deficit is greater 
than 1 percent of 
revenue or if a deficit 
less than 1 percent is 
not offset in the 
following year, the 
salary paid to the 
members of the 
Executive Council is 
reduced by 25 per 
cent. If a deficit is 
incurred after either 
one of the two 
previous scenarios, 
salaries are reduced by 




Quebec  1996 
2001 
2002 
Balanced Budget Act 2002: 
• The Minister of Finance is held 
responsible for the fiscal targets 
established in the Act. The Minister 
must report to the National 
Assembly in the Budget Speech on 
the fiscal objectives, on the 
achievement of those objectives and 
on the variance recorded, if any. 
The Minister must report annually 
to the National Assembly on the 
impact of accounting policy changes 
upon the financial results of the 
Government. 
 
  Act Respecting the Elimination of the 
Deficit and a Balanced Budget 1996 (It 
was renamed as "Balanced Budget Act" in 
2002): 
• Elimination of the deficit by 1999-2000 
and maintenance of a balanced budget 
thereafter. 
Balanced Budget Act 2002: 
• The government may not incur a 
budgetary deficit. If an overrun of less than 
$1 billion is recorded for a fiscal year, the 
Government must achieve an equivalent 
surplus in the next fiscal year.   
• If the Government achieves a surplus in a 
fiscal year, it may incur overruns in 
subsequent fiscal years up to the amount of 
that surplus. In case that overruns are more 
than $1 bn under special circumstances, the 
overrun should be offset by the Government 
with a maximum of 5 years. 
  An Act to Establish a Budgetary Surplus 
Reserve Fund  2001: 
• Allow the reserve fund to be used to 
maintain a balanced budget under the 
circumstances of disaster, degradation of 
economic conditions or a reduction of federal 
transfer. 
Balanced Budget Act 2002: 
• The government may incur overruns more 
than $1 billion in case of a disaster having a 
major impact on revenue or expenditure, a 
significant deterioration of economic 
conditions or a change in federal programs of 
transfer payments to the provinces that 
would substantially reduce transfer payments 
to the Government. However the overruns 
should be offset within 5 years. 
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Saskatchewan  1995 
2000 
2008 
Balanced Budget Act 1995: 
• The government must prepare a four-year financial 
plan and a debt management plan following each 
general election 
Fiscal Stabilization Fund Act 2000: 
• A fiscal stabilization fund was established in order 
to fulfill long-term objectives by stabilizing the fiscal 
position from year to year. 
The Growth and Financial Security Act 2008: 
• The minister should, each year present the four-year 
financial plan and four-year public debt management 
plan to the Legislative Assembly at the same time that 
the minister presents the estimates for the first fiscal 
year. 
• The minister should present interim report 
containing revised forecast of revenues and expenses 
and setting out difference to the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council. The interim report of revised forecast of 
revenues and expenses should be laid before the 
Legislative Assembly before or on specific date.  
 
  Balanced Budget Act 1995: 
• The government has to achieve a 
balanced budget over a four-year period. 
The sale of a Crown corporation and a 
change in accounting policies cannot be 
used to fulfill the balanced budget 
objectives. Budgetary surpluses must be 
used to repay debt. 
The Growth and Financial Security 
Act 2008: 
• Balanced budget or budget with surplus 
should be achieved  
• Actual balance of revenue and 
expenses or surplus of revenues over 
expenses each year 
• If a deficit results for a fiscal year from 
an special event described in the Act, the 
Government of Saskatchewan is required 
to achieve at least an offsetting surplus in 
the following fiscal year.  
 
  Balanced Budget Act 
1995: 
• Unanticipated and 
identifiable events that 
have a direct impact on 
expenses or revenues. 
The Growth and 
Financial Security Act, 
2008: 
• The expense or 
revenue reduction may 
be excluded if it arises 
from a natural or other 
disaster of because 
Canada is under war or 
under apprehension of 
war as determined by 
the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council. 
 




1992  Spending Control Act 1992: 
• The minister should not present a budget with the 
spending exceeding spending limits. If a certificate is 
issued to increase spending by the President of 
Treasury, it should be published with the main 
estimates or supplementary estimates for the year. The 
Public Accounts for each controlled fiscal year shall 
contain a statement by the Minister respecting 
compliance in that year. 
 
  Spending Control Act 1992: 
• Sets the specific spending limits for 
each fiscal year from 1991-1992 to 1995-
1996 which are subject to certain 
adjustments. 
• The minister may propose the spending 
of a particular year exceeding the limit. 
The spending in excess of the limit may 
be allocated to the two next years and the 
spending limits of the next two years 
should be reduced by the same amount. 
 
  N/A    Reputational 
Sources: 1) Various Fiscal Responsibility Laws from a) LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com and b) CanLII, www.canlii.org. 2) Kennedy and Robbins (2003), The 
Role of Fiscal Rules in Determining Fiscal Performance. 
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Transparency Requirements     Numerical Targets     Escape Clause     Sanction 
National 
FRL applies 









• The central administration and SNGs need to 
present a consistent 10-year macroeconomic 
framework each year. Both the central and 
decentralized budgets must also be in full 
compliance with the medium-term fiscal 
framework. 
• Any contingent liabilities associated with 
concessions, sovereign debt guarantees, and 
legal cases are to be reported annually to 
Congress as part of a Medium-Term Fiscal 
Framework. 
  • The governments are classified 
as in:  
1) critically indebted (red light 
zone) if interest payment over 
operational saving more than 40% 
of and debt stock over current 
revenues greater than 80% , or   
2) Not over-indebted (green light 
zone) if interest over operational 
savings less than 40 percent and 
debt stock over current revenue is 
less than 80 percent. Only SNGs 
in the green light are allowed to 
borrow.   
• Primary surplus has to be at least 
100% of debt service, implying no 
borrowing except to repay 
principal. 
• The ratio of discretionary current 
expenditure over non-earmarked 
current revenue are set by law and 
varies across different categories 
of subnational entities 
 
 
  N/A    • Subnational 
government in red light 
zone is prohibited from 
borrowing; 
• Governments have to 
make across the board 
cuts whenever effective 
non-earmarked current 
revenue are under the 
budgeted amount; 
• Subnational 
governments that have 
excess debt must adopt a 
fiscal-rescue program in 
order to regain fiscal 
viability in two years 
Note: 1997 fiscal legislation established fiscal targets of liquidity ratio and debt payment capacity ratio, which were subsequently incorporated into FRL in 2003.   










Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements     Numerical Targets     Escap




2006   • The Government shall lay in each financial year a medium 
term fiscal plan before the Legislative Assembly along with the 
budget. The medium term fiscal policy statement should set 
forth multi-year rolling targets for fiscal indicators. 
• The government should disclose a statement at the time of 
budget presentation including the significant changes in 
accounting policies and their effects and the contingent 
liabilities created by guarantees. 
• The Finance Minister should  review the budget 
implementation and remedial measures taken to achieve the 
targets every half-year and explain any deviation as well as 
proposing remedial measures before legislature 
• Any measure proposed which may lead to an increase in 
revenue deficit should be accompanied by remedial measures, 
which will neutralize such increase or loss and such measures 
shall be clearly mentioned 
• In case the revenue deficit and fiscal deficit exceed because 
of unforeseen demands, the Government should identify the 
net fiscal cost arising due to natural calamity and such cost 
would provide ceiling for extent of non-compliance to the 
specified limits 
  • Eliminate revenue deficit by 31st 
March 2009; annual reduction of the 
ratio of revenue deficit to the total 
revenue receipt should be 1.5% 
beginning on 1st day of April 2006 
• Reduce the ratio of fiscal deficit to 
GSDP to no more than 3% by 31st 
March, 2009; annual reduction of the 
ratio should be 0.5% beginning on 1st 
day of April 2006 
• Control the total outstanding guarantee 
within the specified limit by Goa State 
Guarantees Act, 1993; No fresh 
guarantee shall be given if outstanding 
risk weighted guarantees exceed the 
limits 
• Ensure that the total liabilities do not 
exceed 30% of GSDP by 31st March 
2009 
• Ensure that the ratio of interest payment 
to total revenue receipt does not exceed 
20% by 31st March 2009 
 
  • On the grounds of 
unforeseen demand 
on public finance 
due to national 
security, natural 
calamities or other 
exceptional grounds 
specified by the 
government 
 




2005  • The government should in each year lay before the legislature 
Macroeconomic Framework Statement, the Medium Term 
Fiscal Policy Statement and the Fiscal Policy Strategy 
Statement. Medium Term Fiscal Plan should set forth three-
year rolling targets for key fiscal indicators• The government 
should disclose a statement  at the time of  budget presentation 
including significant changes in accounting policies and the 
corresponding impact, details of borrowings from the Reserve 
Bank of India and liabilities on the State Government for any 
separate legal entity 
• The Minister of Finance should review the trend of revenue 
and expenditure half-yearly to ensure compliance and should 
lay results before legislature 
• Whenever there is a breaching of intra-year targets of revenue 
or expenditure, the State Government should take appropriate 
measures for increasing revenue and/or for reducing the 
expenditure 
  • Annual reduction of revenue deficit 
from 2005-06 FY, so as to bring it down 
to zero by 2008-09 and maintain revenue 
surplus thereafter 
• Annual reduction in fiscal deficit from 
2005-06 FY, so as to bring it down to 3% 
of GSDP by 2008-2009 
• Ensure within a period of five years, 
beginning from the financial year 2005-
06 and ending on 31st March, 2010, that 
the outstanding total debt including 
contingent liabilities do not exceed 28 
percent of the estimated GSDP of that 
year 
  • On the grounds 
of unforeseen 
demand of public 
finance due to 
internal 
disturbance, natural 
calamities or other 
exceptional 
grounds 











Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements     Numerical 
Targets     Esca





2005  • The Government shall lay in every financial year before the 
Legislative Assembly a medium term fiscal plan along with the 
annual budget. The medium term fiscal policy statement should 
set forth four-year rolling targets for fiscal indicators and assess 
the sustainability 
• The government should disclose a statement  at the time of  
budget presentation including significant changes in accounting 
policies, the contingent liabilities created by guarantees,  actual 
liabilities and the number of employees of the public sector. 
• The Finance Minister should review revenue and expenditure 
trend every 6 months and lay outcomes before legislature. 
• Prior taking policy decision which potentially leads to breach 
of pre-specified fiscal targets, the State Government shall take 
measures to fully offset the fiscal impact for the current and 
future years by curtailing the sums authorized to be paid and 
applied from and out of the Consolidated Fund of the State. 
  • Eliminate revenue deficit by 
March 2009 and maintain 
surplus thereafter 
• Progressively reduce fiscal 
deficit to 3 percent of GSDP 
• Progressively reduce 
outstanding guarantees on long 
term debt, until it can cap 
outstanding risk weighted 
guarantees at 80 percent of total 
revenue receipts in the 
preceding financial year 
  • On the grounds 
of the unforeseen 
demand of public 








  N/A 
Ker
ala 
2003  • The Government shall lay in every financial year before the 
Legislative Assembly along with the annual budget, a medium 
term fiscal policy statement and a fiscal policy strategy 
statement. The medium term fiscal policy statement should set 
forth three year rolling target for fiscal indicators and assess the 
sustainability 
• The government should make disclosure at the time of budget 
presentation on the contingent liabilities, significant changes in 
accounting policies and the corresponding impact, and matters 
which have potential impacts on budget  
• The government should specify the corrective measures to 
control deficit level beyond the target in annual budget. The 
Finance Minister should make a statement in the legislative  
Assembly explaining any deviation from the Act, assessing the 
potential impact and stating the remedial measures 
• Whenever there is either shortfall in revenue or excess of 
expenditure over specified levels during the course of the year, 
the Government shall take steps either to make proportionate 
reduction in the voted expenditure or to increase the revenue.  
  • Reduce the ratio of fiscal 
deficit to 2% of GSDP within a 
four-year period commencing 
from 1st April, 2003 and ending 
on 31st March 2007 
  N/A    N/A 
 










Procedural Rules and 
Transparency Requirements     Numerical 
Targets     Escap




2005  • In each financial year, State Government should lay 
before both houses of the legislature the Medium-term 
Fiscal Statement and the Fiscal Policy Strategy 
Statement. Medium Term Fiscal Plan should set forth 
three year rolling targets for key fiscal indicators 
• The Finance Minister should make quarterly review of 
compliance and lay the outcomes before both houses of 
the state legislature 
• Whenever there is a breach of pre-specified level of 
expenditure or revenue during any period in a year, the 
government should take appropriate measures to offset 
the impacts, including curtailing the sum authorized to 
be paid or applied from and out of the Consolidated 
Fund of State. 
  • Eliminate the revenue deficit by 
31st March 2009 and maintain 
revenue surplus thereafter at the end 
of each year 
• The State Government shall by 
rules specify the targets for 
reduction of fiscal deficit (Which 
are not specified in this act) 
  • On the grounds 
of natural 
calamities or such 
other exceptional 
grounds the State 
Government may 
specify 
  N/A 
Tamil Nadu  2003  • The Government shall lay a medium term fiscal plan 
before the Legislative Assembly along with the budget. 
The medium term fiscal policy statement should set 
forth multi-year rolling target for fiscal indicators 
• The government should disclose a statement  at the 
time of  budget presentation including significant 
changes in accounting policies and their effects and the 
contingent liabilities created by guarantees 
• The Finance Minister should  review the budget 
implementation and remedial measures taken to achieve 
the targets every half-year and explain any deviation as 
well as proposing remedial measures before legislature 
• Any measure proposed in the course of the financial 
year, which may lead to an increase in revenue deficit 
should be accompanied by remedial measures, which 
will neutralize such increase 
  • Reduce the ratio of revenue deficit 
to revenue receipt every year by 3% 
to 5%, depending on the economic 
situation, so as to bring it down to 
below 5% by 31st March 2008; 
adhere to it thereafter 
• Reduce the ratio of fiscal deficit to 
GSDP beginning from 2002-03 
financial year to not more than 3% 
by 31st March, 2008 
• Cap the total outstanding 
guarantees to 100 percent of the 
total revenue receipt in the 
preceding year, or at 10 percent of 
GSDP; Cap the risk weighted 
guarantees to 75 percent of the total 
revenue receipt in the preceding 
year, or at 7.5 percent of GSDP 
  • On the grounds 
of the unforeseen 
demand of public 






by the government 
  N/A 
 




Table A1.6: India (Cont.) 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and Transparency 
Requirements     Numerical Targets     Escape 
Clauses     Sanctions 
Tripura  2005  • The government should in each financial year lay 
before the legislature Macroeconomic Framework 
Statement, the Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement 
and the Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement along with 
budget. Medium Term Fiscal Plan should set forth 
three-year rolling targets for key fiscal indicators and 
underlying assumptions 
• The government should disclose a statement at the 
time of budget presentation including the contingent 
liabilities created by guarantees, significant changes in 
accounting policies and the corresponding impact 
• The Minister of Finance should review the trend of 
revenue and expenditure every quarter to ensure 
compliance and should lay outcomes before legislature. 
Any deviation from the targets should be disclosed 
• Whenever there is a breaching of intra-year targets of 
revenue or expenditure, the State Government should 
take measures for increasing revenue and/or reducing 
the expenditure 
• Any proposed measure which leads to increase of 
revenue deficit should be offset by remedial measures. 
Such statement should seek approval for Revised 
estimates from the legislature 
  • Strive to remain revenue surplus 
• Strive to reduce the fiscal deficit 
to 3% by March 2010 
• Within a 5-years period, from 
1st April 2005 to 31st March 
2010, the total debt stock do not 
exceed 40 percent of the 
estimated GSDP for that year 
• Limit annual incremental risk 
weighted guarantees to 1% of the 
GSDP of that year 
  • On the grounds 
of the unforeseen 
demand of public 




or the exceptional 
grounds the State 
Government may 
specify 




2003  • The government should in each year lay before the 
legislature Macroeconomic Framework Statement, the 
Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement and the Fiscal 
Policy Strategy Statement and report quarterly on fiscal 
development. Medium Term Fiscal Plan should set 
forth there-year rolling targets for key fiscal 
parameters. 
• Whenever there is a breaching of intra-year targets of 
revenue or expenditure, the State Government should 
take appropriate measures for increasing revenue 
and/or for reducing the expenditure 
  • To eliminate revenue deficit by 
March 2009; the annual reduction 
in revenue deficit must be at least  
0.5% of GDP and in the fiscal 
deficit at least 0.3% of GDP 
• Caps on the level of guarantees 
and total liabilities 
• Prohibit the government from 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank 
after 2006 
  • On the grounds 
of the unforeseen 
demand of public 




  N/A 
Source: Various Fiscal Responsibility Laws from internet. 




Table A1.7: Peru 
Political 
Units  Date  Procedural Rules and 
Transparency Requirements     Numerical Targets     Escape Clauses     Sanctions 
National 
FRL applies 




• It is not allowed to enact legal or 
administrative rules interfering with fiscal rules 
• The MEF should produce and publish 
Multiannual Macroeconomic Framework 
(MMF) every year, and approved by the 
council of ministers and the Congress. 
Regional development plan must be consistent 
with the MMF  at national level 
• All external debt operation by regional 
governments should be approved by the 
national government, and the proceeds should 
be used only for infrastructure  
• A Fiscal Stabilization Fund was established 
from the NFPS fiscal surplus, privatizations 
and concession proceeds, and royalty of 
exploitation of national natural resources 
• If the quarterly revenue is below the projected 
figure more than 1.5%, expenditures of 




  For governments at all levels: 
• Fiscal deficit of the NFPS including SNGs 
cannot exceed 1% of GDP  
• Real growth of NFPS spending including 
SNGs no more than 3% per year 
• The total debt of the NFPS cannot exceed 
its fiscal deficit 
•In electoral years, the non-financial 
expenditure executed in the first seven 
months of a year cannot exceed 60% of the 
budgeted amount for the year; and, the fiscal 
deficit of the NFPS in the first half of the 
fiscal year cannot exceed 40% of the 
projected deficit for the whole year. 
For each SNG: 
• The stock of debt may not exceed 100 
percent of the current revenue, and the debt 
service (interest and amortization) may not 
exceed 25 percent of the current revenue 
• The average primary balance for the last 3 
years cannot be negative 
 
  • In the case of 
national emergency 
and international 
crisis with substantial 
impact, upon request 
of the executive, the 
Congress can suspend 
the application of 
fiscal rules 
• If GDP is declining, 
the ceiling for NFPS 
deficit could (with 
proper authorization) 
rise to 2.5 % of GDP 
for a maximum of 3 
years  
 
  • Violation of the 
targets by SNG will 
cause the disruption 
of transfers from 
participatory funds 
such as FONCOR, 
FONCOMUN and 
FIDE 
• The national 
government may 
intervene in the 
operations of a 
regional government 
in the case of a 
breach of the fiscal 
targets set in the 
national MMF or 




MEF: Ministry of Economy and Finance; NFPS: Non-Financial Public Sector. 







Annex 2: Provincial Fiscal Responsibility Laws in Canada: Fiscal Targets 
Provinces  Key Fiscal Targets 




  Deficits and opening debt are not allowed. 
  Net assets of Sustainability Fund may not be reduced to less than zero.  
  Net assets of Capital Account is may not be reduced to less than zero 




  No budgetary deficit. For an overrun of less than $1 billion, an equivalent 
surplus must be achieved in the next fiscal year 
  If surplus is achieved in a fiscal year, overruns can occur in subsequent 
fiscal years up to the amount of that surplus. 
  With overruns more than $1 bn, it should be offset with a maximum of 5 
years. 
Ontario    Maintain a prudent ratio of provincial debt to gross domestic product 
  Plan a balanced budget except extraordinary circumstances.  
  If a deficit is planned, the Executive Council should also develop a 
recovery plan for achieving a balanced budget within specified period 
New Brunswick    Balanced budget: the total amount of the expenses should not exceed the 
total amount of revenue for that fiscal year 
  Reduction of debt: Ratio of net debt to GSDP at the end of each year 
should be less than at the end of the previous fiscal period 
Nova Scotia 
 
  No budget deficit (from FY2002/03 onward)  
  When deficit occurs, it should be recovered by the end of next fiscal year 
Saskatchewan 
 
  Balanced budget or budget with surplus with 4-year financial plan   
  Actual balance of revenue and expenses or surplus of revenues over 
expenses each year 
  If a deficit results for a fiscal year, an offsetting surplus must be achieved 
the following fiscal year.  
Manitoba 
 
  Presented budget must project a positive balance as at the end of that 
year. 
  The balance as at the end of a fiscal year is determined as the average of 
the net results for the fiscal years within the four-year period ending at 
that time.  
 
Sources: 1) Various Fiscal Responsibility Laws from LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com and CanLII, 
www.canlii.org. 2) Kennedy and Robbins (2003). 





Annex 3: Growth of Gross Debt as Share of GSDP/GDP in the Pre- and Post-FRL 
Periods 
 
Table A3.1: Australia 
VIII.    IX.       Pre-FRL     Post-FRL 
States  Date     (Dt-1)/GSDP - (Dt-5)/GSDP     (Dt+5)/GSDP - (Dt)/GSDP 
Western Australia  2000     -2.20%     -2.48% 




















Note: To eliminate the impact of the recent financial crisis on our data set, our data stop at the first half of 
2008. 
Source: Australia Bureau of Statistics 
 
Table A3.2: Brazil 
   
   Pre-FRL     Post-FRL 
 
Date     (Dt-1)/GDP - (Dt-5)/GDP     (Dt+5)/GDP - (Dt)/GDP 
Sovereign Debt 
2000 
   15.13%     2.39% 
Subsovereign Debt 
 
4.99%   
1.31% 
Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) 
 
Table A3.3: Canada 
   
   Pre-FRL     Post-FRL 
Provinces  Date     (Dt-1)/GSDP - (Dt-5)/GSDP     (Dt+5)/GDP - (Dt)/GSDP 
Alberta  1999     -13.16%     -10.65% 










Ontario  2004 
 
-3.97%   
-2.74% 
Newfoundland and Labrador  2004 
 
-23.81%   
-26.54% 
New Brunswick  2006 
 
-6.04%     -0.26% 
Notes: 1) Pre-FRL data of Alberta only date back 4 years before the enactment of FRL. 2) To eliminate the 
impact of the recent financial crisis on our data set, our data stop at first half of 2008. 
Source: Statistics Canada. 
 





Table A3.4: Colombia 
   
   Pre-FRL     Post-FRL 
   Date     (Dt-1)/GDP - (Dt-5)/GDP     (Dt+5)/GDP - (Dt)/GDP 





Source: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
 
Table A3.5: India 
   
   Pre-FRL     Post-FRL 
States  Date    
(Dt-1)/GSDP - (Dt-
5)/GSDP    
(Dt+5)/GSDP - 
(Dt)/GSDP 
Karnataka  2002     3.80%     1.10% 





Punjab  2003 
 
8.10%   
-8.50% 
Tamil Nadu  2003 
 
7.40%   
-3.90% 
Uttar Pradesh  2004 
 
12.90%   
-3.90% 
Andhra Pradesh  2005 
 
7.30%   
-4.50% 
Chhattisgarh  2005 
 
0.90%   
-7.30% 
Gujarat  2005 
 
6.00%   
-8.00% 
Haryana  2005 
 
0.20%   
-7.70% 
Madhya Pradesh  2005 
 
4.50%   
-2.70% 
Maharashtra  2005 
 
7.70%   
-6.20% 
Orissa  2005 
 
7.10%   
-15.90% 










Himachal Pradesh  2
005 
 
13.80%   
-17.30% 
Manipur  2005 
 
11.90%   
4.90% 
Nagaland  2005 
 
-2.20%   
1.30% 
Tripura  2005 
 
12.70%   
-20.90% 
Uttarakhand  2005 
 
12.20%   
-2.90% 
Bihar  2006 
 
6.30%   
-12.60% 
Goa  2006 
 
-3.30%   
-2.80% 
Arunachal Pradesh  2006 
 
31.10%   
-9.60% 
Jammu and Kashmir  2006 
 
10.90%   
-0.60% 
Meghalaya  2006 
 
6.50%   
0.50% 
Mizoram  2006 
 
39.80%   
-2.80% 
Jharkhand  2007     2.30%     0.00% 
Notes: 1) 2009 data are budget estimates and 2010 data are revised estimates; 2) Due to limited data, Pre-FRL 
data of Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand only date back 4 years before enactment of FRLs. 






Annex 4: Government Debt as Share of GDP 
 
Figure A4.1: Australia - Gross Government Debt as Share of GDP 
 
 









































Note: SNG=Subnational Government, CG=Central Government






















































































Note: SNG=Subnational Government, CG=Central Government






























































Note: The amount of onlending from centre to states is netted out from  the data of centre.
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